# ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Eliot Scott for the Master of Arts in Anthropology presented October 23, 2008.

Title: Militarization & Functional Changes at the United States-Mexican Border.

Undocumented migration across the US-Mexican border has become a divisive issue in US discourse following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Since 9-11, the United States has engaged in a buildup of physical structures, militaristic tactics, and legal procedures to prevent undocumented migration. This thesis examines the extent and effects of border militarization. Ethnographic data were gathered in 2007 and 2008 from interviews with migrants, US employers, immigrant rights groups, border guards, military personnel and residents in six US states and two Mexican states. Worsening macroeconomic conditions drive laborers from the global South to seek jobs in the US. Concurrently, militaristic spectacles and panoptic surveillance at the border make illegal immigration more difficult than in the past, and increases in fees and legal complexity discourage legal migration. Although US businesses in the agricultural and service industries have suffered due to increased border enforcement, US corporate beneficiaries of the increasing militarization remain in government-sponsored security and defense industries. This border study contributes to political and economic anthropology and the study of structural violence.

# MILITARIZATION & FUNCTIONAL CHANGES AT THE US-MEXICAN BORDER

by

ELIOT SCOTT

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in
ANTHROPOLOGY

Portland State University
2008

# MILITARIZATION & FUNCTIONAL CHANGES AT THE US-MEXICAN BORDER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures

## I. Introduction

I walked down to El Paso Street and followed the signs toward the border. Every storefront was bustling with energy as vendors hawked blankets with Disney characters and US sports team logos. I wound my way through the crowds until I reached a gated area with turnstiles that said it would cost me US $.35 or 5 pesos (about US $.45 cents at the time) to cross into Mexico over a foot bridge. I decided to walk to the west along the border first. Steel fence with barbed wire at the top extended from the border crossing. It wove through a downtrodden neighborhood with several cars on cement blocks in the streets. The windows of the apartments had steel bars on them and rotted wooden shutters. I followed the fence to a dead end street where a white ford SUV sported a green stripe and a US Border Protection insignia. The vehicle appeared to be empty. At the end of the street beyond the SUV a gate sat open along the border fence with more barbed wire at the top. Beyond the gate lay several sets of railroad tracks forming a junction. I wanted to investigate but felt that going into the track area might cause me some legal problems. I meandered back through the neighborhood and returned to the turnstile.

At the turnstile, a Latina woman worked behind a window at a booth to my right making change for people – almost all of whom appeared to be Hispanic. I handed the woman a dollar when it was my turn and she gave me US change. I didn't happen to notice whether other people used dollars or pesos, though I suspect they preferred to use dollars as US $.35 was slightly less than 4 pesos at the then-current exchange rate of roughly 11:1. I entered the turnstile and walked casually toward the

top of the arched bridge while others hurriedly strode by me. Below I could see clear, seemingly clean, fresh water rushing through some concrete barriers that formed a channel resembling a small canal. To the south of the clean water canal was yet another steel fence with barbed wire at the top. This fence had plastic blinds woven through it, making it impossible to see through if one were at ground level. Border patrol vehicles parked along this fence, spaced every couple hundred yards or so. And to the north of the border patrol vehicles lay the railroad tracks which led to the junction I had seen earlier. A black railroad bridge from Mexico ran parallel to the pedestrian bridge I was on. On the other side of the tracks was yet another fence before the main fence I had navigated earlier. I would shortly discover that this system of fencing was somewhat inconsequential to achieving its goal of preventing unauthorized migration across it.

I arrived at the top of the arch of the bridge which demarcates the international boundary between Mexico and the United States. At that line there was a small overlook on the side of the main pedestrian path where one could stand and look over the Rio Grande valley toward the west. Beyond the fences to the south of the clean water canal and the railroad tracks lay a sloped concrete riverbed with graffiti on both sides, mostly containing anti US sentiments and stenciled images of the Latin American folk hero Che Guevara. The river itself appeared to be only a few feet deep and about 150 ft wide. The water was brown and filled with plastic bottles and other debris.

Along with several other people, I stared out over the militarized river valley for a moment. We then watched as several people walked along the graffiti laden concrete on the south side of the river. Near the black railroad bridge, several young men and a young woman hopped along crates in a shallow part of the river and crossed to the north side. While the others waited beneath a support structure of the railroad bridge, one young man scaled the north side of the sloped concrete riverbed and peeked through a hole in the fence. A US Border Protection SUV was parked near the hole on the US side of the fence. The young man scampered back to the bridge where the group waited. The group then walked single file toward the north side of the concrete river bank and climbed up the bridge's support beam beneath the black railroad bridge and disappeared beneath it. I waited and watched for over a half hour but they did not reveal themselves again.

## *Introduction to My Research*

The two-thousand-mile-long Mexican-US border is arguably the largest and most well known structure exhibiting the economic inequities of global capitalism. Although other nation-state borders throughout the world echo the US-Mexican border's militarization and economic inequities, including the Israeli-Palestinian border in the Middle East (Lagerquist 2004; Weiss 2001) and the Spanish Moroccan border in North Africa (BBC 2005; Bodega, Cebrian, Franchini, Lora-Tamayo, Martin-Lou 1995; Huntoon 1998; Irvine 2002; McMurray 2001), no borders exhibiting these qualities match the US-Mexican border in size and scope. The striking economic contrasts between Mexico and the United States have illustrated this border's functions and benefits over the last several decades. Capital, goods and US citizens have flowed increasingly freely across this border, while militaristic and legal displays of power by the US and its agencies have attempted to discourage the less affluent in Mexico from crossing. Simultaneously, higher paying wage labor in industries on the US side has enticed many impoverished migrants to cross this border nonetheless.

Undocumented migration has been lucrative for US industries, as these industries have often exploited undocumented labor at below market value. However, recent escalations of US policies and structures preventing this migration have created a situation in which the undocumented labor that US industries have come to rely on seems increasingly scarce and therefore more expensive than in the past. Periodic clamp-downs on migrants have happened in the past as part of economic cycles that

have to do with globalization, job anxieties, and xenophobia; but after September 11, 2001 under the guise of homeland security, the United States has engaged in an escalating buildup of physical structures, militaristic tactics and legal procedures that further prevent people from migrating across the border into the United States. Although undocumented migrants once served as an inexpensive, exploitable workforce for US employers, many US industries have suffered economically due to a recent scarcity of migrant labor. Concurrently, US agencies have begun to crack down on US employers who employ undocumented labor with penalties including fines and prison terms. If the border no longer serves as a semi-permeable barrier to Mexican labor for economic exploitation by US employers, what is its function and what entities are benefiting from this increase in militarization?

In order to answer this question, I explored the military, legal and economic functions of the border utilizing ethnographic methods and incorporated anthropological theoretical perspectives and concepts including panoptic theater, structural violence, and political economic analysis. During the course of my research, much of the data gathered illustrated the economic benefits of the border for the US economy and demonstrated the militaristic and legal functions which serve to reinforce these economic benefits. The theatrical display described above was not unusual and similar situations play out along the US-Mexican border on a daily basis. Displays of power by US agencies are commonplace along this international boundary and have intensified in recent years culminating in elaborate militaristic structural projects to seal the border from undocumented migrants who have been demonized

and referred to as ‘illegals’ in US public discourse. Still, these migrants continue to come to the US, finding creative but often dangerous ways around these structures, to seek economic opportunities not afforded to them in their home territories. I will argue that the conditions that encourage their migration are at least partially the result of US policies.

I will demonstrate throughout this thesis that the structures along the US-Mexican border, while seemingly designed to prevent these migrants from entering the US, are primarily part of an intricate system that benefits the corporations and government entities involved in the creation and maintenance of these structures at the expense of US taxpayers. In this first chapter, I will explain my research questions, design, and methodology. In the next two chapters, I will argue that the military functions of the border serve to discipline and punish migrants to defer to US hegemony and that the legal functions of the border perpetrate structural violence against migrants. I will then argue in the last two chapters that these functions have served and continue to serve to further US economic benefits and enrich certain sectors of the US economy. However, the sectors that now benefit from US border policy have shifted drastically with increased homeland security concerns since the events of September 11, 2001.

## *Research Questions*

The movement of people from south of the US-Mexican border into the United States is one of the largest mass migrations in history. The 2000 US Census reported that there are over 9 million known foreign-born migrants in the US from Mexico alone (US Census Bureau). These numbers do not include the many migrants who may have chosen not to participate in this census due to their precarious legal status. In fact, many migrants who attempt this journey across the US-Mexican border often choose to do so outside the framework of US immigration law. Reports state that hundreds die in this attempt and over a million are arrested in the US every year (BBC News 2005). Facing such considerable risks, why would so many choose to undertake this journey? What physical, legal and economic obstacles do these migrants face during this process? And finally, what entities create and perpetuate these obstacles and why? In an attempt to answer these research questions, my wife, one-year-old daughter and I became migrants ourselves, although within the confines of the US, and I set out to explore various locales across the US and along both sides of the US-Mexican border that were germane to this issue.

Literature on the border prior to the events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing restructuring of US border enforcement agencies under the Department of Homeland Security at the end of 2002, has shown that the migration across it was mainly due to economic inequity and that undocumented migrants served as an inexpensive, easily exploitable workforce for US industries (Stoddard 1976b, Kearney 1991, Andreas 1996, Chomsky & Dieterich 1999, Chang 2000). However, in my

initial study of this phenomenon the results showed that US industries, and agriculture in particular, appeared to be suffering economic losses by as early as 2005. According to farmers I interviewed in the Willamette Valley of Oregon and reports from Arizona, California and Colorado, these losses could be traced to an increase in border enforcement and a subsequent scarcity of migrant labor (Bowers 2007, Frosch 2007, Wood 2005). This may be one of the reasons why US industries lobbied heavily for policy changes to allow foreign guest workers into the US and President Bush was pushing Congress for new immigration reforms to allow such workers to obtain legal working status throughout the early part of his second term from 2004 into 2007 (FoxNews.com 2004; PBS.org 2007). In fact, prior to the 9-11 attacks, US President Bush and Mexican President Fox had already begun talks on a bilateral migration agreement (Rosenblum 2004). After the attacks, US security concerns took center stage and although the 9-11 hijackers came through Canada, the US Mexican border had become the focal point of militarized Homeland Security. I wanted to investigate the topic further to discover whether or not economics were still the primary issue surrounding border enforcement, or if factors such as ideology or fear of terrorists had superceded economics as the primary reason behind the increases in border enforcement. I found that although ideology likely played a role in allowing an increase in enforcement, the economic benefits to US industries had remained, but shifted from US businesses in agricultural and service industries toward international corporate conglomerates involved primarily in the military and defense industries.

## *Research Design & Methodology*

I began background research in Portland, Oregon in the early part of 2007. I was introduced to several migrants by an informant who had immigrated legally. I was also introduced to the manager of a dairy farm in nearby Salem through a friend of a friend. These initial interviews proved to paint a far more complex picture of immigration and border enforcement than studies I had read from previous eras (Stoddard 1976b, Kearney 1991, Andreas 1996, Chomsky & Dieterich 1999, Chang 2000). My research forced me to conclude that simplistic narratives of economic hardships and worker exploitation by employers might only be a part of the story of Mexican migrants in the United States.

I designed a multi-perspective study on the current border situation to assess the impact or lack thereof of the post 9-11-01 federal policy and bureaucracy changes. In order to explore the repercussions of these policy changes along the US-Mexican border, I sought out the views of many interested parties. I researched bureaucratic structures, employers, immigrant rights groups, anti-immigrant groups, and the migrants themselves. This allowed me to gain a complete and well rounded understanding of the many actors who play a role in creating the theater of the US-Mexican border.

I obtained detailed life histories of over a dozen migrants, both documented and undocumented, in addition to holding casual conversations with over a dozen more. I encountered these migrants during my research at locations germane to US agricultural production in Western Oregon, Central California and Central Florida; as

well as at locations along the border in Texas, Arizona, Chihuahua and Sonora. To obtain these life histories, I relied almost exclusively on unstructured interviews. According to H. Russel Bernard, unstructured, informal interviews are perfect for investigating migrants. Bernard states that "When you want to know about the lived experience of fellow human beings – …how it feels to make it across the border into Texas from Mexico only to be deported 24 hours later – you just can't beat unstructured interviewing" (2006:213). The unstructured interview worked splendidly as I gathered a wealth of fascinating and heart wrenching tales of migrants and their migrations across Mexico and the US, and these tales often ended sadly with a deportation back to Mexico.

*Figure 1: US & Mexican research sites – 2007-2008*

Bernard further states that the unstructured interview is “excellent for building initial rapport with people…and it’s perfect for talking to informants who would not tolerate a more formal interview” (2006:213). As my informants were sometimes in precarious situations, or had been in the past, I did not record these unstructured interviews on an electronic device, nor did I take notes while discussing their lives and stories. After I initially informed these subjects that I was a student researcher studying the border and briefing them on confidentiality, this interview method allowed me to participate in whatever activity was happening with my informants. Thus I established rapport and gained their trust while gathering this data. I later recorded this data in notebooks and encoded the notes using shorthand and pseudonyms to preserve the informants’ confidentiality. This methodology allowed for a variety of stories and reasons for migrating to surface and these life histories helped to reveal the obstacles the migrants faced and the issues concerning their reasons for documented or undocumented migration. These histories also aided immensely in assessing the impacts of recent policy and structural changes at the border.

I also incorporated the views of employers into the study. I interviewed the manager of a dairy farm near Salem, Oregon, a restaurateur in Portland, Oregon, a construction manager in Houston, Texas, and a construction foreman and a former manager of a Citrus Grove near Orlando, Florida. By interviewing these employers in a variety of industries allegedly known for hiring undocumented migrants on a frequent basis, I uncovered a number of issues concerning the employers’ role. According to these interviews, prior academic reports of worker exploitation for

wages below the mandated US Federal Minimum were in some cases exaggerated while more recently, all employers I spoke with reported they were having great difficulties just finding workers who were qualified to do the jobs required and had to pay wages well over the federal minimum and in some cases higher than the market rate even for workers who might have been undocumented. This data suggested that there had been a functional change at the US-Mexican border when compared with the situation documented in previous studies.

The key bureaucracies I investigated included the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), especially the Border Patrol division, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The US decided to restructure its existing border bureaucracies, including the infamous Immigration and Naturalization Service, or INS, following September 11, 2001. CBP, USCIS and ICE combined with several other government entities during their creation in 2002 to form the US Department of Homeland Security, or DHS (US Department of Homeland Security 2008). The investigative portions of the former US Customs Service as well as the now defunct INS merged to form ICE (US Customs and Border Protection 2008b, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2005). DHS created USCIS to focus exclusively on immigration and citizenship services (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2008d, 2008e), while they reorganized the former US Border Patrol with the non-investigative portion of the US Customs Service to form the CBP (US Customs and Border Protection 2008a). Knowledge of these agencies is

central to understanding the overall legal and military structures of the US-Mexican border as they enforce the policies generated by the US government.

After several attempts on my part to obtain some access to these agencies, Josiah Heyman – an anthropological expert on border bureaucracies – informed me that people have a notoriously difficult time penetrating these institutions beyond interfacing with a public relations spokesperson. I therefore elected to observe the activities of US Customs and Border Protection at the physical border, and had several casual conversations with patrolmen. These conversations revealed a wealth of information, even though the patrolmen were not always entirely forthcoming. In El Paso, I visited the Border Patrol Museum, which displayed some of the history and attitudes of this institution. The combination of these methods aided me in painting a broad picture of the functioning of this border enforcement institution.

Although I was unable to investigate US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and US Citizenship and Immigration Services in the same manner as CBP, I obtained some information on ICE from newspaper articles and their website documenting several of their activities. In researching the USCIS by phone and internet, I gained a perspective on the process of obtaining legal immigrant status. Fortunately, US laws require USCIS, ICE and CBP to give the public access to information that could be considered somewhat sensitive or controversial in the context of this research, such as increasing fees, the use of prison labor, or no bid corporate contracts. Although buried and difficult to find, much of this information is available on the agencies websites – uscis.gov, ice.gov and cbp.gov. These taxpayer

funded institutions by their nature act as major players at the border and I needed to investigate them to gain an overall understanding of the stage on which the theater of the border unfolds.

In order to understand the overall social discourse, I investigated several anti-immigrant and immigrant rights groups. This allowed me to gain insights into the attitudes and opinions of people on opposite sides of the immigration debate in the US. I was able to speak with representatives of immigrant rights organizations in Portland Oregon, Salinas California, and Tucson Arizona, and this gave me a perspective of the issues that face both migrants and communities at the local level in several regions. Although I attempted to contact anti-immigrant group spokespeople, I was unable to set up interviews with them. I therefore investigated the internet sites, blogs and chatrooms of several anti-immigrant groups and activists, which allowed me to comprehend their arguments and positions regarding migrants and undocumented immigration.

Although utilizing internet technologies as part of my research design did not allow me to gain face to face contact with these individuals thus making their statements more difficult to put into context, Wilson and Peterson have argued that "the distinction of a real and imagined or virtual community is not a useful one, and that an anthropological approach is well suited to investigate the continuum of communities…regardless of the ways in which community members interact" (2002:456-457). Their analysis implies that researching an online chatroom is roughly equivalent to attending a meeting of any particular group. I have also found during

other research that individuals often feel able to communicate more candidly when their identities are at least somewhat concealed in a technological shroud. In order to verify that the research I performed on this group online was representative, I spoke with several individuals who shared similar sentiments personally and located some books and articles that espoused views similar to the ones I found during the internet research (Dougherty 2004, FoxNews.com 2004, CNN 2007, Confessore 2007). In researching the opinions of members on both sides of the border issue, I attempted to glean a more complete view of the overall discourse regarding the border.

I also engaged heavily in observation of areas such as fences and walls at the physical border. During these observations, I made detailed mental notes of how the border was constructed and how it physically functioned so that I might better understand its role as an obstacle to migration, its processes as a bureaucratic and political structure, and the surrounding political and military display of power and dominion over a region and its people.

My research took me from the farming communities in the Willamette Valley of Oregon, through California's Salinas Valley and Central Florida's Citrus Groves, to the desert border towns of West Texas/Chihuahua and Arizona/Sonora. Although the majority of my family's migration was out of economic necessity, and we were merely following temporary jobs my wife obtained as a health care worker, the places we visited matched my research design quite effectively. I felt that this personal migration became an important as part of the research not only in understanding the overall structure of the border and its wider effects in communities throughout North

America, but also in understanding what it is like to be in a constant state of flux, moving from place to place, unsure of where the next source of income for my family might be. This allowed me to understand, absent the obstacle of a militarized international boundary, what the life of a migrant is like. My wife and I moved with our infant daughter across the US for nearly a year, mostly together though they stayed with her parents during a lull in her work while I conducted research in El Paso/Juarez and Arizona/Sonora. Throughout this yearlong US migration, we faced numerous economic and logistical obstacles that all migrants – whether international or not – encounter.

Much of the data I obtained throughout my fieldwork is contained within this thesis, and yet more had to be removed for a variety of reasons. The omission of some of this data pained me greatly as the stories that I gathered from many of the migrants were all fascinating tales, sometimes told in the hope that someone would know the teller's plight. As one deported migrant stated, "It would be nice if someone other than my Mom knew what happened to me." Unfortunately, many parts of this and other stories were destined for the chopping block as the analysis of structural phenomena that create such stories became paramount in exposing the paradoxes of structural border functions and their economic benefits.

Throughout this thesis, I will argue that the military functions of the border in effect discipline and punish migrants forcing them to defer to US hegemony, that the legal functions of the border inflict structural violence against migrants, and that these two functions work in conjunction to perpetuate each other in an escalating feedback

loop. These functions are often antithetical to their stated intentions, but they effectively further US economic benefits and enrich the US economy – albeit in somewhat different economic sectors than they had prior to the restructuring of the border bureaucracies and the accompanying increase in militarization following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Functional changes at the border since its restructuring following 9-11 have been extremely beneficial to a select few, while for the vast majority of migrants, employers and citizens on both sides of the border these changes have been highly detrimental. Without suggesting an elitist conspiracy or any type of conscious intent on the part of those entities that have certainly benefited from these changes, (for, as Marx has pointed out, those who set out to change social structures often create unintended consequences (Marx 2004)), I will analyze how the structural functioning of the border creates these benefits and consequences – intended or not.

## II. Functions of Militarization

I rode a shuttle van to the town of Nogales, Arizona and hopped off in a parking lot a stone's throw away from the border station. Barbed wire adorned the tops of fences everywhere – around the lot and along the tops of the walls that divided the valley and the nations. A sheet metal wall crawled from the valley border station up the hillsides to the east and the west. The valley acted as a natural funnel to the border patrol station. I walked around the town of Nogales and along the sheet metal border walls with the barbed wire on top. I noticed border patrol agents at about hundred yard intervals along the wall, hanging out in the familiar white SUVs with green stripes. As I walked back to the parking lot where I had arrived, border patrol agents cuffed a Hispanic man's hands behind his back and loaded him into a white and green van.

As part of my research, I investigated towns along the border and observed the events that played out at these locations. These theatrical displays of the border patrol apprehending people whose crimes often involved the search for gainful employment took place on a regular basis and the scene described above was not unusual. The US-Mexican border has grown increasingly militarized since the terrorist acts carried out against the United States on September 11, 2001. Although this militarization began before September 11, 2001 (Andreas 1998), recent news reports have shown an increasing use of surveillance technologies and fencing as well as more security patrols in the region (Arizona Star 2006, BBC News 2007, Christian Science Monitor 2006).

Several days earlier and three hundred miles to the east, emerging from the pitch black of night in West Texas, I had arrived in the El Paso area at around five in the morning after an all night bus ride on Interstate 10. To the north of the freeway everything was still pitch black, but to the south the landscape was lit up with yellow electric bulbs. The dawn revealed an oil refinery to the south, and the Rio Grande and Cuidad Juarez were just a few miles beyond it with the lights extending well into the distance.




*Figure 2: Satellite image of the El Paso/Juarez Region*

I arrived at the bus station and my brother came to pick me up at about six in the morning. I would stay with his family on this evening at the Fort Bliss Military Reservation for a visit. We grabbed some breakfast at the IHOP back to the east on I-10 and then meandered over to Starbucks and sat outside watching the morning rush hour traffic on I-10 and its access road. Just after we sat down, a white bus with a

green stripe and a US Customs and Border Protection insignia passed with several people in the back behind gated tinted windows. Several minutes later a white helicopter with a green stripe buzzed overhead low to the ground.

"That's a border patrol chopper, right?" I asked.

"Yeah, they run those and some black ones out of Bliss all the time. There's CIA and Army Rangers stationed there that are involved with it somehow," he replied.

The helicopter headed south toward the border.

"It looks like its violating Mexican airspace," I said.

"I've wondered that too because it looks like they get awfully close. But even if they do, what the hell is Mexico gonna do about it?" he asked with a chuckle.

To explore the functions and extent of the militarization described above, I researched towns and cities along the southwestern US border and analyzed my data using the blended anthropological theory of Panoptic Spectacle.

## *Panopticism, Spectacle and the Border*

The theatrical displays of the border patrol apprehending migrants took place on a regular basis and the scene described above in Nogales was not unusual. To understand the performances which took place at the border, I relied heavily on panoptic theory and military spectacle. The militarization of the border I witnessed creates an atmosphere that mimics a prison reminiscent of Foucault's description of the Panopticon (1979). Foucault's theoretical analysis of Bentham's architectural Panopticon suggests that it represents a spectacular display of power and control. Similarly, the US-Mexican border functions as a site of surveillance and disciplinary power. The Panopticon's circular structure with a ring of cells on the interior and a wall defining its external boundaries allows for constant surveillance of inmates within the walls from a central control tower that houses a guard or guards who peer down at the inmates. The US-Mexican border surveillance lacks the architectural compactness of Bentham's Panopticon, because the border is linear as opposed to a circular prison. Nevertheless, the essential theoretical functions of the border mirror those of the prison analyzed by Foucault. In the prison, inmates look back up toward the shrouded tower unable to return the gaze, and so they must assume that the entity in the tower watches them at all times. At the border, I personally witnessed empty Border Patrol SUV's sitting idly near holes in fences to deter would-be smuggled migrants. The vehicles cause fear and anxieties that force migrants to behave deferentially to the regulations imposed by those who control the surveillance. In the Panopticon, whether guards sit in the tower or not becomes increasingly immaterial with time; the

deferential behavior of the inmates becomes institutionalized. At the border, the group of migrants I witnessed scaling fences along the border in El Paso saw the empty SUV and hid beneath a bridge, waiting for the guard to move elsewhere. In prison, forced to assume the guard is watching, the inmates begin to police their own behavior, and thus they succumb increasingly to the authority of those who control the tower (Foucault 1979). Although somewhat dated, Foucault's theories of surveillance and disciplinary power as a means of controlling people remain very useful when analyzing events at the US-Mexican border.

The US-Mexican border functions as a site of surveillance and disciplinary power. The detentions and surveillance activities described earlier in this chapter create a "segmented space, observed at every point" thus creating a "model of the disciplinary mechanism" (Foucault 1979: 197). The barbed wire and the sheet metal walls, which one informant claimed belonged to a Vietnam War military encampment, act as a physical manifestation of structural and psychological warfare. Whether the actual source of the fencing material was indeed from a Vietnam War era military encampment becomes somewhat immaterial; it is the perceptions and the climate of power and fear created by the materials' alleged source that perpetuates violence against those whom the fences and surveillance activities intend to intimidate and discipline. The entities that control the border break it into zones, and the guards who patrol those zones often remain hidden from the migrants' view. The border patrol SUVs parked at the fence described at the beginning of this thesis illustrates this Panoptic gaze. The SUVs were often empty, but their symbolic power remains. This

forces those who would scale the fence to believe they are being observed and they modify their behavior accordingly. By design, this situation disciplines migrants to respect the authoritarian rule of the US over the border territories.

Although the US-Mexican border surveillance lacks the architectural compactness of Bentham's Panopticon (the border is linear as opposed to a circular prison), the essential theoretical functions of the border mirror those of the prison analyzed by Foucault. Foucault states, "Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used" (1979: 205). The multiplicity of individuals in the panoptic schema utilized at the US-Mexican border includes not only Mexican citizens who wish to enter the US, but also the Mexican nation itself as an entity separate from the US. Nevertheless, migrants frequently violate this panoptic authority. As one migrant I spoke with stated – "Let them build a bigger fence: Mexicans will climb it!" Thus, Foucault's theories are only applicable to a degree, because they minimize discussion of agency and resistance.

To supplement the panoptic structures at the border, the US has further engaged in a traditional military display of spectacle to threaten and suppress the inmates on whom the panoptic gaze is focused. The use of military spectacle to intimidate a population the offending army wishes to dominate, although a centuries old tactic used heavily by colonial armies (Kaplan 1995, Myerly 1992), remains an effective method to discipline those whom the spectacle intends to subject, as well as to demonstrate to the anti-immigration constituency in the US that the government is

acting on their concerns. The phenomenon of 'shock and awe' as spectacle "focuses on the psychological destruction of the enemy's will to fight" (Rather 2003). Shock and awe was the stated tactic of the US military at the onset of the Iraq war in 2003, and is therefore primarily associated with that event. However, the spectacle of shock and awe is no less a policy employed by the US as a psychological tactic to destroy the will of the migrants as well as US citizens to resist or even question US border policies.

The spectacle created during the surveillance activities at the border intends to convey a sense of awe and fear among those who are to be disciplined. Taking a cue from the British Empire, the US recognized that "Spectacle is an intrinsic dimension of armies and conflict" (Myerly 1992:105) and further that "spectacle…and panopticon, coexist as technologies of power" (Kaplan 1995:93). The US has co-opted these technologies and utilized them as an intimidating disciplinary technique. The detentions, surveillance and probable violation of airspace intend to intimidate and discipline migrants, would-be-migrants, the Mexican state, and US citizens and residents to behave deferentially to US hegemonic power, as well as placate those US citizens who would prefer they be disciplined – reassuring them that their government is acting on their concerns.

In the following sections of this chapter, I will demonstrate how the US Military, the physical border, US Border Patrol, and local police departments utilize spectacle and panoptic surveillance to discipline and intimidate migrants. I will then

show how this intimidation turns people against one another, thus furthering deference to US hegemonic authority.

## *US Military*

My brother and I left the Starbuck's and headed toward his house on Fort Bliss. The US Army base is a huge sprawling military complex that divides the city of El Paso in two. The base contains US Army and Air Force personnel and equipment, in addition to the forces of several US friendly countries including Germany and Japan. And it just happens to be situated on a ridge overlooking downtown El Paso and the Rio Grande – the US-Mexican border.

We approached a fence with barbed wire at the top and a gated entry with several uniformed guards stationed in between the traffic lanes. My brother asked me for my ID. I worried about my Oregon driver's license due to its change of address sticker. He assured me that it would be preferable to my passport containing a Moroccan stamp in Arabic.

"You already look like a terrorist," he said with his trademark smirk.

The utilization of a passport as a document of national identity has become increasingly problematic in the globalized economy. Anderson suggests that passports are "less attestations of citizenship, let alone of loyalty to a protective nation-state, than of claims to participation in labor markets" (1994:323). Passports from many countries, including the US, give no inkling of a person's loyalty to a nation (Coutin 2003). One Mexican migrant I interviewed who had attained US citizenship said he was pleased to get his passport for labor purposes and because he could easily travel back to Mexico to visit his family. However, he held no national loyalty to the US and was disgusted with its policies toward Mexican citizens.

When we got to the checkpoint the guard looked at our identity documents briefly before handing them back.

“Have a good day sir,” the guard said.

“Well that was easy. I forgot you were an officer now,” I teased my brother with no response.

We drove onto the base, which seemed somewhat deserted and arrived at his house. At the end of his block was the extension of the military base border fence complete with barbed wire at the top. From this ridge-top fort, we could see the entire Rio Grande valley, including downtown El Paso and its sprawling sister city Juarez in Mexico – once known as El Paso Del Norte.




*Figure 3: Map of Ft. Bliss and the White Sands Missile Range*

The location and size of the US Army’s Fort Bliss is another spatial and economic representation of US control of the region. The base accounts for a large amount of local economic activity, over 2 billion US dollars per year, and is the

region's number one employer (Soden, Schauer, McCune, Coronado and Conary 2004). The base and its munitions testing range sit on a ridge that splits El Paso between East and West and the city forms a V-shape around the military base. "Fort Bliss…is comprised of approximately 1.12 million acres (1,875 square miles) of land in Texas and New Mexico" (Global Security.org 2008). This dwarfs the roughly 250 square miles the city of El Paso occupies (City-Data.com 2008a).

After lunch my brother, nephew and I headed off to the mountains for a hike. When we got to the top we met another hiker who discussed the Bills-Cowboys football game of the previous evening after noticing my Buffalo hat. After chatting for a bit, he asked what two guys from Western New York were doing in El Paso. We told him that my brother was stationed at Bliss and I was doing anthropological research – which was a source of considerable humor for him. We then learned that he was a former US Army major who was now working for a defense contractor.

"Us evil contractors," he said with a grin.

He was at Ft. Bliss to sell some air defense equipment to the Army. Coincidentally, my brother was in Air Defense.

"Why air defense is such a big deal in El Paso?" I asked them both.

"That's a good question" the man replied. "It's not like Mexico poses any military threat."

I noticed a black chopper buzzing off the base heading south toward the border.

"It looks like that chopper might be in violation of Mexican airspace," I remarked.

He chuckled and replied "It's not like they can do anything about it."

Fort Bliss also serves as a primary training ground for air defense. Occupying the high ground, the ridge-top fort overlooks the valley below and into Mexico. This tactical location is akin to the central tower of the Panopticon looking down into the valley prison below, and its status as an Air Defense hub suggests to the Mexican nation and its migrants that the US is a powerful force to be not only respected, but feared. Further, the incessant buzz of the helicopters serves to remind the population in the valley that the panoptic gaze is also airborne, thus watching them from every possible angle. This not only cautions those who would cross the border from Mexico that they are being watched, but also serves as a warning to those on the US side of the border that their government is extending its panoptic gaze onto them as well.

***Borders Within Borders***

The shuttle van I took back to Tucson left Nogales with a full load of ten to twelve passengers and went back up Interstate 19 as the pale glow of day in the desert deserted us. When nightfall descended on the desert, I noticed some flashing orange caution signs ahead on the side of the road. We had reached the 'temporary' border checkpoint and there was a long line of vehicles in front of us with several sets of floodlights below the bridge at Agua Linda Road. As we crept closer, I noticed several white vehicles with the green stripes and CBP logos parked up on the bridge. Below the bridge there were several border patrol agents with German Shepards on leashes. A uniformed border patrolman pulled our shuttle van aside, though he waved most passenger vehicles through. As we pulled off to the side, I observed several agents thoroughly searching a Dodge convertible. One Anglo patrol agent with a shaved head questioned three Hispanic men next to the vehicle. I could not see the license plates to know the vehicle's origin. All the passengers in my shuttle dug out their IDs suggesting they had been through this before. I got mine out as well. A young Anglo agent approached us and asked our nation of citizenship verbally. Everyone answered "U.S." Without examining our IDs, the patrolman waved us through and the van drove back onto the Interstate. I looked at my ticket stub and noticed it said that "your immigration status is your responsibility" in both English and Spanish, despite the fact that the shuttle never crossed an international boundary.

The border is not only a physical line demarcating an international boundary. For migrants particularly, it is a social boundary that extends well beyond the initial

crossing of the international line. There are multiple borders – language, ethnicity, cultural, and legal – that migrants contend with and the surveillance continues well past the border crossing itself (Chavez 1992, Stephen 2007). I encountered several of the physical border checkpoints described above inside the territorial US during the course of my research – two permanent checkpoints on either side of El Paso on Interstate 10, and the above described 'temporary' checkpoint on Interstate 19 at Agua Linda Road between Nogales and Tucson, Arizona. Several people on the I-10 Greyhound complained about the checkpoints near El Paso wondering why they needed to declare their citizenship when they never left the US. Equally curious, I decided to research the borders within border phenomenon.




*Figure 4: Black Dots Represent Border Checkpoints along I-10 and I-19 – 2007*

The Tucson Citizen newspaper reported that the checkpoint at Agua Linda Road used to float along Interstate 19 at various points but had become semi-permanent at this location in 2006 after the retirement of an influential local congressional representative whose replacement could no longer prevent US Customs and Border Protection from keeping the checkpoint at the location (Morlock 2007). "The rationale for the permanent checkpoint was outlined in a 2005 report by the Government Accountability Office: Permanent checkpoints on I-19 and elsewhere serve as a 'third layer' of enforcement after the border itself and the area just north of it" (Morlock 2007).

This "third layer" of enforcement, extends the atmosphere of the border inside US territory. "The borders…are no longer at all situated at the outer limit of territories: they are dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled" (Balibar & Williams 2002:71). These borders within the border extend the auspices of US power and control beyond the international boundary to encompass strategic locations within the US nation itself. The borders within borders, along with stringent requirements for identification documents to attend schools, get health care, drive cars, or even travel in a shuttle van to visit relatives in a neighboring town, extend the panoptic gaze to encompass those on the US side of the border as well.

Further, these borders within borders utilize the panoptic gaze to discipline US citizens to behave deferentially toward agencies such as the US Customs and Border Protection's Border Patrol and other enforcement entities, thus increasing their power

and influence. “The U.S. Border Patrol appears to be moving forward with its plans to open a permanent checkpoint on Interstate 19 despite concerns of some residents in the area” (McCombs 2007). Local residents protested the semi-permanent installation at Agua Linda Road after several smuggling related shootings had occurred in a town five miles south of the checkpoint, along with an influx of undocumented migrants who were avoiding the checkpoint and looking for food and water all along the valley.

Smugglers and migrants, aware of the semi-permanent checkpoint, were heading off the freeway and into the small towns, which was in fact by design. “The checkpoints are designed to get illegal immigrants and drug traffickers off the interstate and make them easier to identify and catch” (Morlock 2007). According to such logic, smugglers and ‘illegal immigrants’ appearances must differ significantly enough from local residents and documented tourists for highly trained US Border Patrol agents to identify and apprehend these individuals whose behaviors have violated their mandates. However the population of Tubac, the town at the center of the controversy, consists of nearly 1,000 people, 18% of whom are Hispanic (City-Data.com 2008c).

As the appearances of US Hispanic and Mexican Hispanic people are generally indistinguishable, the effort by the US bureaucracy to make the installation permanent despite the protests of local residents rather extends their surveillance activities to encompass territory beyond the international border. This in turn disciplines US citizens, documented tourists and permanent residents to behave deferentially to US hegemonic power. This power is embodied by the US Customs and Border Protection

and other bureaucratic enforcement entities and these entities serve to enforce established codes of behavior that perpetuate discipline and extend the panoptic gaze.

The suspension of democratic processes at these borders within borders creates what Giorgio Agamben referred to as a "state of exception" to democratic norms, and further allows US power to encroach on the everyday lives of US citizens (2005). In a state of exception, current law is suspended due to some form of emergency, whether actual or perceived, and a new legal paradigm takes shape that often "allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system" (Agamben 2005:2). In the case of the checkpoint near Tubac, the categories of residents who are to be removed are non-US citizens who are Hispanic while those US citizens who happen to be Hispanic can likewise be encompassed into this marginalized category.

States of exception to the law have become the norm of US policy since 9-11-01. The USA Patriot Act of October 2001 allowed for a seven day detention of any non-US citizen suspected of endangering US national security. This state of exception expanded in a subsequent exception under a military order by President Bush whereby any non-US citizen suspected of terrorist activity could be detained indefinitely and tried by military commission (Agamben 2005). These states of exception suspend the original legal precedents, and create new legal structures "in which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension" (Agamben 2005: 3). These states of exception by design consolidate power and discipline not only the living beings encompassed by the exception, in this case non-US citizen Hispanics, but also those

who might for whatever reason be suspected of being encompassed by the exception (US Hispanic citizens), to behave in ways that will not violate the norms dictated by the exceptions. Accordingly, any undocumented non US citizen within the confines of the border of the United States, as well as anyone who might appear to be an undocumented migrant within the United States, must defer to the state of exception or risk being detained indefinitely.

## *Border Patrol*

While doing research at the border in El Paso, I walked from the Chamizal National Monument to the International Bridge of the Americas. I looked at the US border checkpoint and observed numerous Mexican tractor trailer trucks waiting to cross the border. I decided to take a picture of them. Just after I took the picture, a white SUV with a green stripe pulled up behind me on the grass to my right so slowly and quietly I did not hear it. I looked over somewhat startled at a Hispanic border patrolman in dark sunglasses.

"What are you doing?" he asked.

I told him I was a researcher from Oregon studying the border. He looked at me through the sunglasses and said nothing. He did not even move. Finally after a rather long and what I deemed uncomfortable silence, I asked what he was doing.

"Just watching the border," he said.

I asked if he'd like to be interviewed and he smiled at me. He immediately proceeded to drive into the middle of the Border Highway, bringing oncoming traffic to a screeching halt, and parked his SUV on the sloped median.

In utilizing surveillance technology of my own, I had turned the panoptic gaze of the camera back toward the CBP. Although I had not violated any law by taking a picture of the activities at the border, I violated the rules of the border theater. I had shown a lack of deference to the CBP and their functional monopoly on surveillance by taking a picture of their panoptic border, which they created by fear and intimidation. The CBP found this appropriation of their methodical surveillance

techniques to be untenable. Therefore an agent proceeded in an attempt to harass and intimidate me by sneaking up from behind with covered eyes, a few brief words, and a gruff demeanor, thus reasserting the power and dominance of the CBP's panoptic gaze. Moreover, by asking the CBP agent if he would like to be interviewed, I had refocused my academic gaze back upon the CBP a second time through the patrolman. Perhaps the patrolman found the mirror of surveillance I held up to him uncomfortable because he preferred his more traditional role as the faceless entity watching from the tower. In suggesting that I put him under surveillance, I reversed the roles. He found this unsettling so he left, reasserting his dominance in an intimidating and dangerous display of power through highway traffic.

Although my encounter with the border patrolman demonstrates that people can and do resist the border's panoptic authority, my encounter also demonstrated that the primary effect of the Panopticon is "to induce in the inmate a sense of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power" (Foucault 1979:201). In the above case, I was the inmate and I had violated established deferential behavioral norms by taking pictures of the border checkpoint. As Foucault describes the Panopticon, "One is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen. It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes power" (1979: 202). I was stealthily caught in the act of this behavioral violation and subsequently intimidated by an agent of the panoptic entity whose eyes were not visible to me. This arrangement assures that "the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the

perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary" (Foucault 1979:201). The agent had ensured that I would be conscious that my actions in the future would be visible and observed by a powerful, ever-watchful and faceless entity; even if no one was in fact watching me. As my research continued, I discovered that it is not only federal enforcement agencies that make up this faceless entity and that the entity extends into all corners of the US enforcement apparatus.

### *Local Police*

As I walked along Tucson's trendy 4th Avenue after an interview with an immigrant rights organization, a middle aged Hispanic man asked me if I could help him get back to Phoenix. He seemed distraught so I asked him what had happened. He had come to Tucson the day before with a friend and his girlfriend. The friend started drinking and the girlfriend got mad and left for New Mexico to visit her family. The friend went after her, stranding my informant in Tucson. He called his employer in Phoenix to tell them what happened and called several co-workers who were unable to drive two hundred miles round trip to get him. He needed twenty dollars for a bus ticket home and had panhandled five but had already used it to feed himself. I asked if he could hitchhike back to Phoenix, but he was worried he would be questioned by police and possibly deported. He was stuck in Tucson with no good options, given his status, for getting back to Phoenix.

This individual engaged in risky behavior by traveling a great distance with his unreliable friend. However, the Panopticon of border enforcement had disciplined him to police himself as much as he could to avoid behavior, such as hitchhiking, that would lead to his arrest and deportation. The Panopticon's "architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers" (Foucault 1979:201). The power of the US border enforcement apparatus had extended itself beyond the border, beyond territory, and had entered this individual's psychology.

Across the country, undocumented migrants have been deported after routine traffic stops for making an illegal left hand turn, speeding, or even having tinted windows (Vitello 2006). A representative at human rights organization *Derechos Humanos* explained to me during an interview that this happens routinely in Arizona, even with undocumented migrants who are passengers in a vehicle at such stops. *Derechos Humanos* held meetings with volunteer lawyers present for migrants to help them understand their rights, and encouraged undocumented persons to take public transportation whenever possible to avoid such entanglements.

Avoiding the behavior of riding or driving in passenger vehicles for this reason is yet another example of self-policing behaviors. The outcry over former New York governor Eliot Spitzer's proposal to allow undocumented individuals to get drivers licenses (Confessore 2007) demonstrates the notion that US institutions and public discourse adhere to the policy that undocumented individuals should not engage in the behavior of driving. In avoiding that behavior, they have decided to discipline themselves. Although a number of immigrant rights advocates educated undocumented persons to utilize their right to remain silent at such stops to avoid deportation (Associated Press 2008b), this was riskier than taking public transport. A number of local police agencies trained officers to identify undocumented migrants, detain them and release them to the custody of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, even after minor or routine traffic stops (Vitello 2006). Accordingly, there were those who succeeded in avoiding the Panoptic gaze while engaging in the behavior of driving through the right of silence, but this behavior carried greater risk

of apprehension, and it was therefore a behavior that was beneficial to self police in one's own interest.

Sometimes, an individual's self interest also tended to extend further, beyond merely policing one's own behavior. Given that Ft. Bliss and other military and border enforcement entities comprise the majority of the local economy in the area, for many in the rural southwestern US it became economically necessary to join the faceless panoptic border enforcement entity, thus serving to enforce the panoptic gaze on those whom the border oppressed.

## *Divide and Conquer*

The towns I observed along the border while traveling between research sites in El Paso and Tucson were small and appeared economically depressed. There were numerous billboards along the interstate advertising for border patrolmen. The most frequent billboard showed a young Hispanic male with a military brush cut and a brimmed hat scowling at motorists.

My bus stopped at a McDonald's in Lordsburg, New Mexico. While standing in line for some food, I observed a border patrolman in full uniform, complete with firearm, speaking on his cell phone in Spanish to his wife about a dinner they were having in the evening. This seemed somewhat ironic as many who oppose Mexican immigration cite the lack of assimilation to the English language as a primary reason they want to stop illegal immigration.

The demographics of Lordsburg and other small towns along the southwestern border are heavily Hispanic and also economically depressed. Lordsburg had an unemployment rate of just under 12% and the population was nearly 75% Hispanic in 2000 (City-Data.com 2008b). Most people living in Lordsburg found employment in construction and in the service industry and the median household income was just over twenty thousand dollars a year. Not surprisingly, the town lost over 18% of its population between 2000 and 2005 (City-Data.com 2008b). Given the economic situations of towns such as Lordsburg and the lack of viable employment opportunities, it is not particularly surprising that the area became a fertile recruiting ground for US Customs and Border Protection.

I mentioned to a volunteer at an immigrant rights organization in Tucson that I had noticed a number of border patrolmen were of Hispanic descent.

"They're the worst ones," she said. "Most of the people who come to us for assistance say they'd much rather be stopped by white patrolmen because they treat them better."

The phenomenon of Hispanic US Border Patrolmen behaving in a derogatory manner toward Mexican migrants was not isolated to this account or to Arizona. In 2005, a Texas court convicted two Hispanic US Border Patrolmen of shooting an unarmed Mexican migrant who was running away from them. The patrolmen then proceeded to cover the incident up by destroying evidence and filing false reports (Porteus 2007). Given the economic situations of many towns along the border, new migrants represent competition for wages. Yet the industry of border militarization depends on the perceived threats of a flood of new undocumented migrants. Thus the employees at the US Department of Homeland Security depend on the flow undocumented immigrants they attempt to prevent. This division of ethnicity segregates Hispanics from either side of the border further, putting them into economic and nationalistic ideological competition with one another, and this creates animosity toward those on the other side of the divided ethnic community.

The strategy of dividing those with similar ethnic and linguistic backgrounds is a well established subjugation technique of colonization. Noting the divisions between Africans, African Americans and African Caribbean peoples, Jackson and Conthran believe the European system of slavery incorporated a "strategy of 'divide and

conquer'…, which prevent[ed] Black people from recognizing their strength in unity" (2003:597). Cook-Lynn speaks of a "US policy of using warfare and divide-and-conquer tactics to subjugate and dispossess indigenous peoples" during the nation's westward expansion (2004:27). And this strategy is by no means confined to the subjugation of foreign peoples. In many cultures and in societies throughout history the powerful "pursue divide-and-conquer strategies that capitalize on competition and conflicts between peasants" (Popkin 1980:461). The technique effectively allows elites to exploit the community in question by dividing it against itself. This also appears to be the case with many of these border patrolmen along the US-Mexican border.

## *Conclusion*

The militaristic functions of the US-Mexican Border described throughout this chapter effectively intimidate, discipline, punish and divide Mexican and US border residents. The spectacles of fencing and border checkpoints as well as the surveillance activities carried out by the US Military, US Border Patrol and local police attempt to discourage migrants, would be migrants, the Mexican state and US residents from violating established behavioral norms and to discipline them to defer to US hegemonic authority, while in the process reassuring those US citizens who are against undocumented migration that the government has a coordinated response to the perceived problem.

Foucault argued that "Power had to be given the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible…It had to be a faceless gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field of perception: thousands of eyes posted everywhere" (1979:214). This omnipresent surveillance of the border panopticon disciplines all the actors who come under its gaze to follow and obey the procedures and policies which the border panopticon adheres to. Foucault further states that "One of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique" (1979:218). Accordingly, discipline strives to fix nomadism, to prevent migration.

Thus it would appear as though these policies were designed to discipline migrants to prevent their migration into the US. Those policies are, however, not what they appear to be. Michael Kearney suggested that "the surveillance activities of the

Border Patrol are not intended to prevent [the migrants] entry into the United States to work, but instead are part of a number of ways of disciplining them to work hard and accept low wages" (1991:128). The migration prevention activities of the border enforcement apparatus become a functional paradox. This is due to the reality that "the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital…cannot be separated" (Foucault 1979:221). In the US capitalist economy, corporate profit depends on cheap labor, which in turn increases power for those who reap these profits. Moreover, in creating "states of exception" after 9-11-01, the US government has engaged in a policy that further erodes the legal protections and individual freedoms of both undocumented migrants and US citizens alike (Agamben 2005). At the US-Mexican border, these states of exception create an atmosphere of institutionalized fear and subservience, supplementing the spectacle and panoptic gaze to suppress the working populous to defer to US dominion. Thus the utilization of spectacle, states of exception, and panoptic techniques continues to serve as a power generating mechanism for the economic benefit of the few to the detriment of the many.

The military functions of the border work to create a climate of fear and deference to US hegemonic authority. These functions labor in association with political and legal functions to effectively achieve an economic benefit. In the next chapter, I will discuss the legal functions of the border and how they complement the military functions. I will then turn to the economic functional history of the border and the shifting of economic benefits away from US employers of undocumented migrants due to this increase in militarization and changes in recent border policy.

## III. Legal Functions

Cesar came to the US when he was two years old and his mother promptly renamed him George, although no legal evidence of this name exists. George grew up in San Diego, California. He later enrolled at a state university in the San Diego area. He needed a little extra money to cover his living expenses and applied for a federal student loan. The counselor called him and informed him that he had been denied the loan. He went into the office and she showed him that his named had been marked with “X’s” through it. He asked why that would happen and she asked if he had been convicted of any drug offenses. He told her no and she said the only other reason would be if he wasn’t a US citizen.

Shortly thereafter, US immigration officials began contacting George’s mother at her residence, searching for him. His mother, who had become a citizen by marriage, convinced him that he should turn himself in to immigration officials. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained him for a few months in California pending a deportation hearing. After the hearing, where the judge reminded him he had been previously deported after a Baja surfing trip, they walked him from the detention center across the border with no money or possessions, just the clothes on his back. As he walked into Mexico, they called to him, “Hey Cesar” and he turned around. “I knew that was your name,” one officer said. “Don’t ever come back,” said the other.

Many of the former migrants to the US I encountered during my research in Mexican border towns had not been deported for any violent or drug related criminal

behaviors, as many anti-immigrant web activists suggest. Former migrants like George/Cesar had simply been at the wrong place at the wrong time, or engaged in seemingly routine behaviors that most US citizens participate in regularly before getting deported for those behaviors. US law does not treat undocumented migrants as equals and does not afford them the same rights and privileges as those who are born on the US side of the border.

### *Legal Production of Militarism*

The militaristic functions at the Mexican-US border would not work absent their conjunction with US legal functions. According to De Genova, the border "provides the exemplary theater for staging the spectacle of 'the illegal alien' that the law produces" (2002:436). By legally producing the 'illegal alien' the law constructs the stage on which the spectacle of border surveillance plays out. De Genova continues, "The elusiveness of the law, and its relative invisibility in producing 'illegality', requires the spectacle of 'enforcement' at the U.S.-Mexico border" (2002:436). In producing illegality, the law serves to initiate the military enforcement spectacle which in turn intimidates those who are to be disciplined to behave deferentially to the United States of America (Gledhill 1999).

The law further "renders a racialized migrant['s] illegality visible and lends it the commonsensical air of 'natural' fact" (De Genova 2002:436). Accordingly, the law supplies the pretext that produces the visibility of ethnic illegality, and this pretext generates a public discourse which is self perpetuating, defining the migrant by his/her legal status. Further, rather than merely suggesting that a person has done something which is contrary to legal convention, or that a person who has migrated illegally is therefore "undocumented", US public anti-immigrant discourse suggests a person's existence as an undocumented migrant is illegal – defining them as illegals. This in turn creates the impression that this prevalent ethnic group is in 'fact' illegal, by having violated the terms of the law and its disciplinary functions. This demonstrates a loss of control of the border that supplies "the pretext for what has in fact been a

continuous intensification of militarized control on the U.S.-Mexico border" (De Genova 2002:436). Thus the law and militarization work in conjunction to generate a self reinforcing feedback loop. The law expedites and intensifies militarization, and this militarization creates a spectacle which renders ethnic illegality visible, which furthers the discourse of illegality and provides a pretext for further militarization.

I will argue that US immigration law, while appearing to encourage legality, in actuality employs a number of codified techniques to prevent those who do not meet certain qualifications from migrating legally, and to discourage those who are undocumented from obtaining documents. These techniques function differently from Agamben's states of exception, in which the threat of undocumented migration justifies the suspension of legal procedures. Instead, the US utilizes and expands upon the legal procedures already in place, in addition to the militaristic escalation discussed in the previous chapter, to manufacture what I call a "state of expansion". This state of expansion further increases the size and scope of existing US laws, policies and procedures on migration, thus making it even more difficult to migrate legally and creating a system so formidable for migrants to navigate that it inevitably forces them to operate outside that system. These procedures include exorbitant processing fees, complex legalese necessitating the procurement of an expensive legal expert, and unreasonable temporal demands. And they function as techniques to discourage legal migration and to intimidate undocumented migrants from becoming legal. Further, as these procedures likely increase the number of undocumented migrants, they increase the discourse of the 'threat' of undocumented migration, which

justifies increased militarization and legal ‘states of exception’. As the discourse of illegal immigration threatening the US increases, it suggests that poor would-be immigrants have a viable route toward legal immigration. However, rather than providing a legal path to migration, the US has raised processing fees and legal complexity discouraging immigrants from immigrating legally. According to statistics compiled by the US Department of Homeland Security, Mexican immigrants’ naturalization has consistently decreased over the last several decades (Baker 2007). Meanwhile, costs to become a citizen have continued to go up (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2008a, 2008b) and the complexity of the legal system continues to increase, both of which force migrants to procure expensive legal advice. In discouraging legal migration via economic means, immigration law functions as a structure that commits violence against migrants and their families – intimidating, disciplining and punishing those whom the law has created.

### *Structural Violence*

Structural violence is caused by large scale economic, political and social conditions. It is a face-to-faceless violence, often so large and pervasive that people fail to see it despite being caught in its midst. Structural violence is not overt or even intended but rather results from the inequity inherent in certain structures, including the hierarchical global political and economic systems (Galtung 1969). Certain nation states in the global system maintain distinct advantages in its operation and therefore gain a privileged status in its hierarchy (Galtung 1969). The US sits atop these structures while Mexico and other nation states in Central and South America are generally situated toward the bottom of the hierarchy (Schaeffer 2003). This political and economic hierarchy puts individuals from states situated near the bottom at a distinct economic and political disadvantage from the outset, and these disadvantages function to systematically inflict structural violence against these individuals in the form of a lack of basic necessities (Galtung 1969) including food, shelter, clothing and heath care – all of which are traded in exchange for cash wages gained from labor for the more privileged within the global capitalist system.

As I will explain in the subsequent chapters, these violent structures and processes include, but are not limited to: the formation of nation-states and militarization of borders, codified regulations that require an individual to have certain documents yet simultaneously prevent them from obtaining those documents, colonialism, national debt, and free-trade agreements. The socio-historical processes of colonialism and the chronic indebtedness of peripheral nations put individuals from

areas outside industrialized nations at an extreme economic disadvantage (Schaeffer 2003), and they are often forced to migrate toward areas of greater economic prosperity. Global capitalism espouses the doctrine of free trade throughout the world and the disintegration of the borders that define nation-states to allow their capital and assets to move without barriers (Appadurai 1996), yet it also encourages the militarization of such boundaries and places legal burdens on individuals who seek to cross such boundaries so that marginalized populations remain desperate enough to work for the lowest wages possible (Kearney 1991, 1995). In this way, the global marketplace imposes structural violence against the poor of the peripheral states and allows core elites to accumulate more capital.

Structural violence is caused by social, political and economic conditions that inherently favor particular groups of people to the detriment of others (Høivik 1977). In the case of the US-Mexican border, the favored groups constitute corporate elites in the US with a wealth of capital, followed by a similar group in Mexico. The disadvantaged groups include US citizen laborers and their Mexican counterparts. This hierarchical structure systematically inflicts violence against the lower levels of the structure and disproportionately affects those at the bottom. Accordingly, the paradoxical structures in place that force laborers to leave their home territories in the peripheral states of the world to seek wage labor in the core states to attain their basic necessities for life, also seek to prevent them from doing so with consequences including arrest and possible death.

Throughout the next two chapters, I will argue that many of the structures the US has in place have the effect of committing structural violence against migrants from south of the border. First, I will focus on the ways in which the US legal system produces militarization and structural violence. These legal structures and processes include exorbitant legal fees and legal complexities which discourage legal migration. In the subsequent chapter, I will discuss the ways in which the economic disparities between the US and Mexico often caused by colonialism, national debt, and free trade agreements are equally important when discussing border structures.

## *Fees*

I met Miguel while doing research in Portland, Oregon. Miguel's sister had migrated to the US many years earlier, married a US citizen, and became a citizen herself. When she and her husband opened a restaurant, they asked him to move to San Diego to work for them. Since Miguel had no reason to stay in Mexico after a failed marriage, he decided he would give it a try. Using money he had money from a computer sales job in Cancun, he purchased a Mexican passport for about $100. However, in order to obtain a business visa, which would have allowed him an extended stay, he would have needed at least $27,000. As he did not have nearly that much, Miguel purchased the tourist visa and moved to San Diego. Upon arrival in San Diego, he worked at his sister's restaurant all day and went to English classes at night.

After several months, they received a letter from the social security administration stating that the social security number used in his employment at the restaurant did not exist. Because Miguel's sister and her husband could lose their restaurant and face fines and possible jail time for employing him without proper documentation, he left San Diego and went to nearby Tijuana, Mexico to stay with some family members. There he retained the services of an immigration lawyer and began the legal process of immigration. First Miguel sent an application to US immigration to see if he could qualify to come to the United States to work. This application cost about $200 and contained no guarantees that he would qualify, he might have just thrown his money away. Since his sister was already a citizen through marriage, he qualified to come to the United States by having an immediate family

member as a naturalized citizen. His lawyer told him that if his sister were not a citizen it would have taken around fifteen years to qualify. Miguel then filled out more forms, got fingerprinted and photographed, and paid more fees. He estimated that the fees added up to around $3,000 not including the lawyer, and took nearly a year to process. He then received a permit to work in the US for one year. He renewed the permit every year for five years, paid more fees each time, and could not leave the US soil during this period. After the five years he received a ‘green card’, which he noted was actually pink, that showed his permanent legal residency. He could then return to Mexico legally to visit his other family members, as well as procure permanent legal employment.

Three thousand dollars constitutes a considerable sum merely to obtain the right to legal employment, even for the majority of US citizens. Although smuggling fees are quite expensive, even by US standards, two other migrants I interviewed who got smuggled in to the US paid $1500 and $500 less than what Miguel paid to enter legally. This figure does not include Miguel’s fees to his lawyers. Further, both of the undocumented migrants arrived in matter of weeks instead of years. The fees and waiting times required of Mexican citizens to obtain the legal right to work in the United States are therefore not in line with market forces. If a migrant can pay less to arrive in the US sooner and obtain employment that compensates the migrant more than it would have in his/her native land, then the majority of migrants will likely elect to do so.

If the US were interested in decreasing the amount of 'illegal' labor entering the US across the Mexican border, then the law would logically lower the fees and waiting times required of migrants to obtain lawful employment in the US. However, US law has done exactly the opposite. In 1993 it cost only around $100 to apply for citizenship, but as of 2007 the cost has risen to $675 (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2008a). And the application for citizenship represents merely the last step of a lengthy and expensive process. One must first apply for permanent residency, have the application accepted, and then stay in the US for five years. In 2007, fees to apply for lawful permanent residency and/or employment have skyrocketed and in most cases the fees to file application forms have doubled or tripled in recent years (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2008b). These fees also assume one's eligibility to migrate legally. Miguel had a naturalized immediate relative in his sister[1]. Without his sister, he would have had to wait 15 years for work permit eligibility. If he pursued legal status without his sister, he would likely still be waiting[2].

Thus, although the overall public discourse advocates for legal and permanent immigration to the US and has for several decades (Chock 1991), fees to immigrate are simultaneously raised to levels that manual laborers cannot afford. Whether this is intentional or not, these fees effectively prevent poor workers from obtaining the proper documentation to labor for basic necessities at market wages under legal working conditions. A number of migrants I spoke with cited high fees and long

[1] Although another migrant had an uncle in the US, he was not eligible as his family member was not immediate (USCIS 2008a).
[2] An employer may also sponsor a migrant for permanent residence, an unlikely scenario for a migrant without a highly specialized and sought after skill given the volume of undocumented migration (USCIS 2008a).

waiting times as the primary reason they chose to migrate without documentation. Additionally, the majority of migrants without the benefit of a citizen relative have little recourse but to migrate outside the US legal framework due to the extreme temporal requirements. The number of naturalized Mexican immigrants has decreased severely every decade since the 1970's due at least in part to the increased fees. "Mexican immigrants naturalized at a rate of 45-50 percent for the 1970's cohorts, 35-40 percent for the 1980's cohorts, and 20-30 percent for the 1990's cohorts" (Baker 2007). Although the data on the first decade of the new millennia have not yet been completed, this trend would suggest that the number of naturalized migrants during this decade would be between 10 and 20%. Considering recent policy and fee changes, and the difficulty poor migrants have with the fees, many migrants will likely continue to have difficulty with legal migration and the numbers of naturalized migrants may continue to decline. The legal regulations that require one have a naturalized immediate relative and pay large sums to the US government for processing fees and the necessity of a lawyer due to complex laws, force the majority of would-be migrants to immigrate illegally. In the next section, I will examine the legal complexities that necessitate the procurement of an expensive legal expert.

### *Legal Complexity*

Deciphering US immigration law is a daunting task, even for a native English speaker. As part of my research, I combed over hundreds of forms, documents and regulations at the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) web site. I found it unclear which forms applied to whom and how to fill them out. I spent hours scouring over various legal documents at the USCIS website and had trouble deciphering the legal jargon. When I called for clarification, I navigated a complex phone menu system to try and discover what one might need to do to immigrate legally. Speaking with an actual person on the phone required heavy maneuvering through the phone menu systems and a considerable hold time. I twice spent 30 minutes on hold before abandoning the quest. This participant observation suggests there is no easy way to contact an individual without spending a day at an immigration office waiting in line, assuming there is an office nearby.

Given my own difficulties in traversing the legal immigration landscape, I would assume navigating the US legal structure for a non-native English speaker is considerably more challenging. Although the US Citizenship and Immigrations Services phone hotline provides assistance in Spanish, complete with an equally lengthy hold time, and the USCIS website offers some documents translated into Spanish, the majority of the legal documents necessary for immigration exist solely in English legalese. It is therefore not surprising that Miguel hired a lawyer to assist him. But lawyers cost money, as does the application process. For someone who lacked Miguel's US cash (from a computer sales job in he had in Cancun before he migrated),

such a process may be financially unfeasible, even if one had a relative already in the US. Thus the structures in place engage in a covert violence that prevents the most desperate from obtaining legal working papers and therefore encourages them to migrate outside the US legal framework and remain there.

On numerous occasions, my research illustrated the necessity of lawyers in confronting legal dilemmas. For example, I met Jose while doing research in Juarez. Jose grew up in El Paso and met his future wife in Juarez while he was out for an evening with friends. Although he was a US citizen, she was a Mexican citizen. When they decided to move in together, she went across the border on a tourist visa and they lived together in El Paso. She had a job working at a restaurant and got pregnant. They were planning to get married so she could apply for citizenship but were waiting to save money for a big wedding. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement raided the restaurant his wife worked at and he got a call that his fiancée was being deported.

Jose left El Paso and moved to Juarez, marrying her a little too late. They retained the services of a lawyer to assist them to no avail. Although he wanted to go back to El Paso to raise his child, they were told by the lawyer that his wife must wait 3 years and apologize to the US government for staying in the US illegally before she could go back.

Jose's situation demonstrates not only the necessity of a lawyer to navigate complex law, but also how the US inflicts structural violence against its own citizens. The apology letter Jose's wife must send further demonstrates that one must behave deferentially to US hegemonic authority. Jose's family will need to hire a lawyer in

order to be sure to follow the proper procedures to have their life in the US restored, despite the fact that two of the three family members are technically US citizens living abroad.

The demand for lawyers has created a huge legal community in El Paso. Several blocks from downtown, hundreds of law offices and firms operating from old Victorian homes specialize in immigration. All of the migrants I encountered in Juarez who had been deported and wished to return to the United States had hired or were planning to hire one of these lawyers to assist them at considerable expense. An immigration lawyer often charged several hundred dollars for the most basic cases, a sum not easily obtained through legal means in Juarez. Thus, the border and the activities of its legal and military apparatuses assist in generating an enormous amount of economic activity for the local legal community in El Paso and elite immigration lawyers economically benefit from the suffering of migrant families.

### *Political Representation*

None of the difficulties described above in navigating US legal complexity to migrate surprised Cesar Lara, the Director of The Citizenship Project in Salinas, California. I arrived a few minutes early for my formal interview with Cesar and was greeted by a worker who was assisting an elderly couple with legal services in Spanish. She told me Cesar had not arrived yet but I could have a seat and wait. I sat and looked around a cluttered office filled with old metal file cabinets. Spanish posters advocating labor organization and pictures from the days of agricultural labor organizer Cesar Chavez featured prominently around the office.

Activists started the Citizenship Project in 1994 after voters in California passed Proposition 187. A US District Court later ruled the Proposition unconstitutional, but it would have denied health care, education and welfare benefits to undocumented immigrants (CNN 1998). Cesar and other Hispanic organizers believed that Prop 187 passed because not enough Hispanic voters had voted on the measure. They created the Citizenship Project to help migrants who lived in the Salinas area become US citizens and active voters so that they could attain equal rights.

The Salinas Valley supplies the US with many crops. “The Salinas Valley is known as ‘The Salad Bowl of the World’ for the production of lettuce, broccoli, mushrooms and strawberries, along with numerous other crops” (City of Salinas Website 2008). Some agricultural workers Cesar knew said that at least 50% of the Salinas Valley agricultural workers remained undocumented. With the considerable

application and legal fees required for undocumented laborers to apply for legal US permanent residency and later citizenship, the Citizenship Project attempted to keep their legal costs down. They assisted migrants with English and US history lessons at an adult school, and helped them fill out citizenship papers for $65, or roughly at cost. The Project offered free services for a day and signed up 85 people, which demonstrated that many migrants choose to attain legal status when given an affordable opportunity.

I mentioned to Cesar that I had gathered data in Oregon from an employer who said that US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had raided some dairies in the Willamette Valley and that ICE investigators led several employees away in handcuffs. ICE also raided a Del Monte food processing plant in Portland, Oregon in 2007, arresting 167 employees who faced deportation (The Oregonian 2007).

Cesar believed the crackdown on undocumented labor in California was less dramatic than in Oregon, Colorado, Texas, or Arizona due to a large Hispanic congressional caucus at both the state and federal level made possible in part by his and other similar Citizenship Projects. Cesar stated that ICE had carried out raids on individuals wanted for other crimes in the Salinas area. And they often detained people uninvolved in such crimes, merely living at the address of someone long since gone, whom ICE wanted for one reason or another. At such raids, undocumented individuals were simply at the wrong place at the wrong time. But unlike in other areas across the US, ICE had not raided any local businesses in Salinas according to

Cesar. He attributed this to adequate Hispanic representation in legislative bodies at the local, state and federal level.

Cesar wanted a work permit program for undocumented workers, but he stated that no mechanism existed to fix the problem of 11-12 million people working in the shadows, no mechanism allowing them to do it the "right way." One local employer in Salinas stated, "Employers are not hiring undocumented workers because they want an illegal workforce; it's because Congress has failed to provide access to a legal workforce" (Vijayan 2007). An employer in Oregon also argued in favor of changing the politics of the border in order to facilitate the contracts he engaged in with qualified workers. He felt he needed qualified agricultural workers, and thought most Mexicans had more agricultural expertise than Anglos. In an attempt to comply with federal regulations, a landscaper in Colorado tried to find non-immigrant workers to fill fifteen positions he had. Only one person applied and never showed up to work (Preston 2008). The Oregon employer contended that current US policies on migration "hurt farmers and farm workers alike." And he blamed the government for the problems, stating "Only the federal government can fix this problem, but they refuse to do so."

Employers from California to Virginia in industries as varied as landscaping and micro-electronics have echoed similar sentiments, even warning that if they suffer ICE raids, many "[Anglo] American" workers would also lose their jobs (Preston 2008). While employers around the country clamor for the US government to alleviate the low wage labor shortage, the US has done little to allow low wage migrant labor to

legally engage in contracts with US employers. Instead the US has elected to engage in raids on employers to discover undocumented migrant employees, while simultaneously increasing the fines and penalties imposed upon those employers (Preston 2008). This situation mirrors the fee increases on the migrants and the structural barriers put up to prevent their migration. “The system is just as broken for employers as it is for immigrants,” one employer representative stated (Preston 2008).

Bush administration officials argued that the “crackdown” on employers was the price they must pay “to persuade voters to agree to open the gates to immigrant workers” (Preston 2008). The US administration blamed the voters for this anti-immigration discourse, rather than acknowledging the US government role in its creation. By increasing fees and legal complexity, the US may have in fact generated more undocumented migration. Additionally, they shifted the onus of identifying undocumented workers onto employers. The increased threat of undocumented migration provided the pretext for the escalation of border militarization and further enforcement activities – including states of exception. Thus although the Hispanic caucus may have diminished the number of ICE raids in California, they seemed unable or unwilling to stem the nationwide political and legal discourse fueling undocumented migration and increases in border militarization. Fortified by this discourse, the legal obstacles in place generate additional pressure to migrate outside the law. This creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop where the law generates the threat of undocumented immigration, which amplifies the discourse against undocumented migration, thus strengthening calls to enforce and expand the law,

which creates even more undocumented migration. Many US employers have now been caught up in this cycle as the law has expanded upon itself to consolidate its power and strengthen its gaze upon them as well.

## *Violating the Law*

A few days after I spoke with Cesar Lara, the local Salinas Californian newspaper reported that the US Department of Homeland Security would begin fining employers $10,000 when workers' Social Security numbers did not match their names. This prompted one US congressman in the area to state, "I think it's really going to hurt the [Salinas] Valley. A lot of people [here] are undocumented workers who are paying their taxes and aren't breaking the law. Now, their lives are going to be threatened" (Vijayan 2007). Although ten thousand dollars is a considerable sum for an employer to pay in fines, it pales in comparison to the disruption of a deportation of a migrant who has built a life in the US.

When Luis first arrived in Colorado he worked in agricultural fields picking vegetables but quickly found work as a waiter. He met his wife, a US citizen born in Colorado, and they married, bought a house and started a family. He lived in Colorado for 7 ½ years. Luis helped pay for his step-brother to cross the border. His step-brother was arrested after arriving in the US and used Luis' name during his incarceration. This alerted immigration officials to Luis' presence in the country and they found him on a warrant. When they discovered it was not him who was initially arrested, immigration officials told him that he was now in the system and they had to process him for deportation. "Bad luck," they said. Immigration and Customs Enforcement deported him to Juarez.

Luis' wife and child moved to Juarez to be with him while his wife looked for work in El Paso. They tried to save money to hire a lawyer to help them, but they still

had the mortgage payment on their house in Colorado, where they hoped to return someday, so money was very tight. Despite the fact that Luis had married a US citizen and could have applied for citizenship he had not done so. I asked him why he had not applied for citizenship before they deported him. He said that the process seemed very difficult and that everyone needed to hire a lawyer to help. With the house and a child he could not afford one. I told him I felt bad about his situation. He shrugged and said "That's just how it works."

Luis lived as a taxpaying, home owning resident of Colorado. ICE did not deport him for committing a felony, merely for 'bad luck', being at 'the wrong place at the wrong time' and trusting the wrong people. His deportation cost him his job and his home and forced his family of US citizens to migrate to Mexico to remain together. The law makes no exceptions for poor migrants, nor for their US citizen family members, and it perpetuates structural violence against those poor migrants who would violate any piece of it. This disciplines other migrants to stay in the shadows, and in fear of a similar fate befalling them.

One employer I interviewed assisted a naturalized citizen employee who went through deportation hearings due to an arrest in the 1970's. He had already served his time and paid his fine but the employer stated "With INS (now ICE) you never pay off your debt to society. Once you have a conviction you are deportable, period. As an INS agent told me, even if the crime was in the 1920s he would still be deported."

Cesar Lara believed that many would-be immigrants are not allowed to get in line to immigrate legally given the current legal processes, forcing them to come

illegally and remain that way. Many immigrants, like Luis, behaved deferentially to US authority in every other way and if they were given a reasonable opportunity, they would likely defer to US law when they immigrate as well. Cesar stressed that it is a misdemeanor akin to a traffic ticket, not a felony, to cross the border illegally. Although this is true, it is a misdemeanor now punishable by up to 180 days in jail. A second conviction of entry without inspection is a felony punishable by up to 10 years in federal prison (Moreno 2006). There are also many people in the US legally on expired visas, which is a civil offense and not subject to imprisonment (FactCheck.org 2006).

Following Cesar's contention that undocumented migration is legally similar to a traffic ticket, without the threat of deportation, the actions of US law enforcement agencies to police the activities of migrants committing misdemeanors would be akin to creating several bureaucracies and enforcement entities whose only job was to enforce laws such as exceeding the speed limit. Entering the US at an improper time or place, and/or without documentation – i.e. migrating 'illegally' – has remained a misdemeanor with a maximum fine of $250 and a sentence of up to six months imprisonment since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2008c). Meanwhile, the US states of Georgia and Nevada carry harsher penalties for exceeding the speed limit with maximum fines of $1000 and up to twelve or six months imprisonment respectively, while Missouri's maximum fine doubles the $250 while matching the up to six months imprisonment for the misdemeanor (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2008). Fifteen other

US states have stiffer maximum fines for exceeding the speed limit than for entering the US at an improper place (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2008). As crossing the border 'illegally' is legally comparable to excessive speed on the highway in many US states, the US Homeland Security response to the 'threat' of undocumented migration correlates to a militarization of state highways with multiple agencies using millions of taxpayer dollars in a futile attempt to prevent speeders from speeding. This overreaction on the part of the US toward undocumented migration constitutes a state of expansion. The US acted overzealously in response to a perceived threat, though that threat was not considered as great prior to the increased enforcement corresponding to 9-11, and the laws enforcement was subsequently expanded. Further, the US has utilized this militaristic spectacle at the border in response to a minor violation of the law to justify the 'threat' of undocumented migration, which allows for further militarization and increased enforcement of the border.

## *Conclusion*

By institutionalizing structures that make legal immigration impossible for the majority of poor and unskilled laborers, US law functions as a barricade, another border, to legal migration. High fees for poor individuals, complicated procedures and legal jargon for non-native English speakers necessitating the procurement of expensive legal services, and excessive waiting times for assistance for both undocumented migrants in the US and would be legal migrants outside the US create structural violence against poor laborers. Thus the effect of US law, intended or not, functions to discourage legal migration and encourage 'illegal' migration. Although the possible efforts of the Hispanic caucus in congress both nationally and in California may be effective in preventing certain enforcement measures on behalf of undocumented migrants in their district, they have failed to implement any legal changes that would prevent the necessity of undocumented migration to begin with.

The US law produces the 'illegal' aliens and the spectacle at the border increases their visibility. The spectacle in turn justifies the law and allows an escalation in the militarized border spectacle (De Genova 2002). The spectacle created by the law and militarization forces migrants to defer to US hegemonic authority and to behave deferentially to the panoptic gazes of both the law and its enforcement apparatus (Foucault 1979, Gledhill 1999). Although "states of exception" to US law have arisen to further consolidate US power over migrants, the border and US citizens (Agamben 2005, Ong 2006); the US has utilized the expansion of law and military functions already in place to discourage legality and encourage illegality. The

increasing use of military force described earlier and the expansion of legal procedures described in this chapter exemplify this state of military and legal expansion. The political willpower to remedy this state of expansion, even among those sympathetic to Hispanic migrants, is virtually non-existent due to the economic benefits that the law provides. The US economy receives a labor force that is not subject to US law due to the fact that it has been rendered illegal through military, legal and economic functions – which generates economic benefits for the US economy. In the next chapter I will explore the historical economic functions of the border before concluding with the shifting economic beneficiaries of these border structures and policies.

## IV. A History of Economic Functions

The law and militarization of the US-Mexican border function in conjunction with one another to self perpetuate their dominions. In functioning to perpetrate panoptic discipline and structural violence against migrants, these structures benefit the US economy by facilitating the exploitation of migrant labor.

Because undocumented migrants from Mexico are illegal labor, employers in the United States can underpay them and enhance business profits. “Migration and process must be examined in conjunction with the larger structure controlling the ebb and flow of commodity (labor) distribution between Mexico and the United States” (Alvarez 1995:458). Until very recently, these structures functioned to fulfill the economic craving for cheap labor and higher profits inherent in the global capitalist system, thus creating economic incentive for elites in the US to maintain the illegal status for these economic migrants.

Economic inequality prompts mass migration from Mexico to the United States. Michael Kearney states that “The current transnational age is characterized by a gross incapacity of peripheral economies to absorb the labor that is created in the periphery, with the result that it inexorably flows to the cores of the global capitalist economy” (1991:23-24). The socio-historical processes of colonialism and the chronic indebtedness of Mexico put individuals from this peripheral area at an extreme economic disadvantage, and many migrate toward areas of greater economic prosperity. Mexico cannot absorb the labor precisely because of these socio-historical processes. The relationship between strong core states, such as the US, and weaker

peripheral and semi-peripheral states, such as Mexico, is based on an unequal exchange. This relationship allows the stronger core state with economic, political and military advantages to exploit labor and resources in the peripheral state to further capital accumulation for elites in the core (Straussfogel 1997).

Carlos came from a small town in Central Mexico. Lacking any prospects for employment, he decided to come to the US when he turned nineteen. His family arranged for him to come to Central Florida to live with an uncle. They gave Carlos US $1500 to pay a *coyote* to smuggle him across the border.

Carlos was not the only migrant I encountered during the course of my research who left Mexico because he lacked viable employment options. My research findings concur with the vast majority of previous reports and inquiries into this mass migration that concluded that most migrants who cross the US-Mexican border are in search of wage labor (Kearney 1991; Alvarez 1995; BBC News 2005).

In this chapter, I will provide a historical framework of Mexican economic subjugation to US dominion. This historical analysis will show how US policy has the effect of enhancing US economic interests at the expense of Mexico and its current and former citizenry. This chapter will reveal the foundation on which the current border economic structure is built in order to frame the analysis of the recent functional economic changes at the border presented in the following chapter.

## *Colonization*

In order to comprehend the economic functions of the border, investigating its changing historical functions becomes necessary. There was of course a time when the border did not exist and people moved freely through the area. Freedom of movement has become progressively restricted and this constraint has accelerated through the years.

During my research at the border in West Texas, I visited the El Paso Museum of History. Although museums can be thought of as politicized institutions of the 19th century in which items are classified creating an imagined community (Anderson 1991), their archives, particularly first hand accounts of previous times, can yield a wealth of information. Free to the public, this museum offers a good overview of the international nature of the city's history. *El Paseo del Norte* (The Pass of the North) once stretched across the Rio Grande as a single city under Spanish rule. Located on *El Camino Real de Tierra Adentro* (The Royal Road to the Interior) from Mexico City to Santa Fe, its status as the largest city on the road made it the traditional winter resting place for the long journey. Parties would leave Mexico City in the fall, winter at *El Paseo*, and arrive in Santa Fe in the summer.

The blockade of *El Paseo del Norte* by the US government after the military takeover of the northern Mexican territories that began with border patrol activity in 1904 (US Customs & Border Protection 2003) has been a gradual historical process that has culminated in a now heavily militarized and fortified city. This process has extended beyond the pass to encompass a two thousand mile political boundary

separating the economically prosperous US from a Mexico that has economically declined since the loss of its northern territory.

The US has economically subjugated Mexico using many techniques, including the inequity created by colonialism. A summary of Mexican history from *El Colegio de Mexico* reveals the extent to which colonialism has economically disadvantaged the Mexican nation (Villegas, Bernal, Toscano, Gonzales, Blanquel, Meyer 1995). When the Spaniards realized they had found a previously unknown continent, they were eager to take its wealth for Spain. To attract private funds to this venture, Spain granted conquistadors twenty percent of revenue collected in the exploitation of resources from the territory. Conquistadors busily stripped the land and its indigenous inhabitants of precious metals and other resources to send to Spain. This exploitation of the people and land continued from 1519 until 1821 when Mexico gained independence from Spain after eleven years of war. The war cut production in both mining and agriculture, leaving the new nation with a debt of 76 million pesos to mainly foreign creditors and a treasury facing a state of chronic bankruptcy (Villegas, et.al. 1995).

Mexico proceeded to lose the state of Texas in 1836 to colonists from the United States who wished to form an independent nation. Mexico reluctantly allowed the quasi-independence of Texas as it did not have the resources to prevent this takeover, but when the US admitted Texas as a state in 1845, the Mexican American War began. The US invaded and proceeded on a two-year march through Mexican territory, raising its flag in Mexico City in September of 1847. Mexico forcibly

surrendered and relinquished 890,000 square miles of land in what has become the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California receiving a mere 15 million dollars in compensation (Villegas et.al 1995), a sum equivalent to about 385 million 2008 US dollars (Sahr 2008). The Mexican residents of this acquired territory suddenly and unwillingly became a part of a new country, leading to a refrain popular in the immigrant rights movement – "We didn't cross the border, the border crossed us" (D'Amato 2006).




*Figure 5: Territory forfeited by Mexico to the US – 1830-1860*

Following the US-Mexican War, *El Paseo* and its residents began to fracture. A salt war erupted when Anglo interests wrested ownership of a once communal local salt mine. A local businessman in El Paso in 1870s, Ernst Kohlberg wrote to family in Germany "When you read about trouble on the border, always discount the stories by ½. The demand for war in many…newspapers…and especially in Texas is caused by

speculators who want to make fortunes furnishing war supplies. The freedom of the press is abused" (El Paso Museum of History). As I will later demonstrate, modern day corporate speculators are making fortunes providing supplies for border militarization. Militaristic mongering and profiteering, it would seem, has remained a constant in this region.

In 1877 Fort Bliss reestablished the US border presence with Texas Rangers after being a confederate station during US Civil War (Old Fort Bliss). The Texas Rangers also constituted the first border patrol in the region (Border Patrol Museum), often harassing resident Hispanics (El Paso Museum of History), and continued to be the primary policing entity for several years after the founding of the US Border Patrol in 1924 – which had many more outposts in the north concerned with whiskey running (Border Patrol Museum, US Customs and Border Protection 2008b). Despite assurances from the US government in 1848 that Mexicans living in the territory acquired by the US would receive equal rights, the US government denied voting rights to the majority of Mexican Americans based on race by the 1870s and schools had often become segregated (El Paso Museum of History).

The US colonization of Mexico differed from the Spanish by not only extracting natural resources, but also never returning the land itself – rather absorbing the land into the colonizing nation for a paltry sum. Mexico had no choice but to relinquish the land to the *nuevo conquistadores* and never fully recovered from this colonial legacy of lost resources and territory. Political instability and chronic debt have plagued the nation ever since. Likewise, former Mexican citizens who had the

border cross them were denied rights in the new US territory based solely on their ethnic heritage. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the US border enforcement apparatus continues to harass the US citizen descendants of these former Mexican citizens with border surveillance inside US territory and the deportations of wives, husbands and children often forcing entire families to leave the US, the only country they have ever known. This regional history established a continuing trend of US economic dominion over Mexico that persists to the present. Further, this economic domination of Mexico, which benefits the US economy, assisted in the production of the desperate economic migrants.

## *Economic Subjugation*

Driving around the town of Salinas, California revealed a great deal about its economy, political geography and demographic makeup. Old Salinas had expanded slightly since the days of Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*, but not much compared to the metropolises elsewhere in California. Driving a few miles in any direction from the center of town brought me to expanses of spinach fields being picked by hundreds of Hispanic laborers. School buses filled with Hispanics could be seen around town and in the fields. Men and women arrived at the fields and emerged from the buses wearing work clothes and carrying a bag for lunch.

Hispanics did not always pick the crops in the Salinas Valley, nor was the Salinas Valley always an area engaged primarily in agriculture. The Salinas Agricultural Museum downtown gave an excellent overview of the area and its transition into one of the world's premier agricultural production centers. The lands the Spanish missionaries took from the indigenous peoples in the area in the 16th and 17th centuries were gradually converted into private ranches in the 1820s. By the 1850s, former Mexican citizens still living in the Salinas area often found themselves unable to establish proof of title for their lands under US law. The former Mexican citizens forfeited much of this land to the newly arrived Anglo settlers. Former Mexican citizens with the ability to establish title to their ranches often mortgaged them to cover the court costs of doing so (Salinas Agriculture Museum). These legal policies and procedures amounted to a massive redistribution of land from its Hispanic

owners to the newly arrived US Anglos, depriving many Hispanics of their means of self subsistence.

After a drought that lasted from 1864-66, many of the remaining Hispanic owned ranches were lost to the mostly Anglo owned banks that held the mortgages (Salinas Agriculture Museum). The new mainly Anglo owners converted these ranches to farms starting in 1860s, but this conversion progressed more acutely in 1909 after the fencing in of cattle began. Although the agricultural laborers consisted mainly of Japanese immigrants in the early 20th century, the labor force began to change with the onset of World War II after the US government removed the Japanese to interment camps. This, along with many American citizens fighting overseas, created a labor shortage. To address this labor shortage, the US implemented the Bracero Program allowing Mexican nationals to come to the US to work. The Bracero Program set a migratory pattern that created a predominantly Mexican agricultural labor force that has persisted to the present (Salinas Agriculture Museum).

Due to the political and economic instability created in the US colonial period, Mexicans and former Mexicans suddenly residing in US territory were forced to migrate in search of work. The largest flow of Mexican migration to the US began in the early 1900s as labor recruiters went to Mexico to find inexpensive workers for railroads and agriculture. During World War II, the US government endorsed this labor migration when it created the Bracero Program legally allowing Mexican guest workers in the US for seasonal agricultural labor. The program ended in 1964 but established a pattern and Mexican migrants increasingly depended on this wage labor

for survival (Villegas et.al 1995). US agricultural producers also enjoyed the benefits of higher profits from an inexpensive labor force.

## *Debt*

The economic subjugation of Mexico and Mexican citizens continued with the perpetuation of debts and the creation of new debts. Mexico took on new debt to foreign banks in the 1970s to support development projects and government programs, as well as to pay old debts and interest (Fussell 2004). They were forced to default on the loans in 1982 and this obliged Mexico under the terms of the loans to open its economy to foreign businesses (Fussell 2004). An employment crisis ensued as local manufacturers and businesses failed, creating a need for further migration to the US. The US responded with new laws making it more difficult for undocumented Mexicans to migrate across the border and increased border policing and enforcement (Fussell 2004).

While in Juarez, my informants George and Felix and I entered an establishment that had the stench of raw sewage. George told him that it smelled and Felix explained that the pipes downtown were bad. He apologized to me profusely for the smell. “I am sorry we are poor here and that it isn’t as nice as in the US,” he said with a genuinely heavy heart. “I don’t know why Mexico is so poor. We should do better but many people are lazy.” He continued to apologize for the poverty level in Juarez specifically, determined that something should be done.

I tried to explain to Felix that US policies contributed to Mexico’s poverty, but neither George nor I could translate the complexity into Spanish. Felix’s insistence to blame his own countrymen for all that ailed his country had its foundation on a discourse of neoliberalism which makes “every citizen an agent of his or her own

destiny" (Ong 2006: 2). This discourse absolves elites from acknowledging any systemically inherent inequalities and pushes the blame of economic problems on to the victims of these systemic inequalities. The discourse teaches the victims to blame themselves and those immediately around them, rather than an inherently inequitable global capitalist system.

Debt accumulated, perpetuating itself in Mexico and other Third World nations during the 1970s because First World lenders "had large supplies of money that they were eager to lend" (Schaeffer 2003:97). The large supplies came from the trade imbalances and debt created in the colonial period as well as money spent on oil. States accumulated petrodollars with large oil supplies that sold the oil to industrialized First World nations. Elites holding enormous wealth in oil producing countries wished to deposit the petrodollars in a 'safe haven' – the banks of the First World. Thus First World banks had a large amount of capital they needed to invest. Banks saw loans to governments as reasonably safe investments because, as one Citicorp chair said, "a country does not go bankrupt" (Schaeffer 2003:99). The loans also helped First World elites because they were mainly used for products created by First World corporations.

The Third World nations also needed the loans to repay debts that had been accruing interest. "Over 60% of [the loan money] was immediately paid back to the banks as debt repayments or interest" (Schaffer 2003:99). Mexico borrowed $88 billion between 1977 and 1979, but "only 14.3 billion was actually available for use in the country" (Schaeffer 2003:99). The banks, led by the International Monetary Fund

and the World Bank, attached strict conditions to the loans. If borrowers defaulted, the terms required debtor nations to open their economies to foreign investment. This investment included selling state owned businesses such as water and power at bargain prices to transnational corporations who proceeded to charge higher fees for these public services.

Many people simply could not afford the services and were forced to find money elsewhere to provide for their families. Third World economies could barely tread water with these loans, forced to repay the previous loans and interest that had in some cases remained since the colonial period. The cycle of debt continued as debtor nations took on debt to repay debts. The interest payments on the debts crippled the local economies, forcing many out of work with nowhere to go but North. These debts combined with the other violent structures to exploit the populations of the Third World.

## *Free Trade*

While I ate at the café where he worked, George introduced me as an anthropologist to two tall, large, pale skinned, middle-aged gentlemen he was waiting on. One explained who I was to the other in a language I guessed was Slavic. They both smiled and nodded acknowledging that they knew the discipline of anthropology. George whispered to me privately that they were from Budapest and that they were here on business. He suggested that their business would be interesting for my research. The one who spoke English asked what I was working on. I told him and asked if I could interview them. The two men managed a branch of a US-based fiber optic networking cable manufacturing company in Budapest that also had plants in China and Juarez. They came to Juarez, considered their North American base of operations, to see how they manufactured the cable in order to replicate the manufacturing process back in Budapest and China. I asked if they could tell me any more about the company but they could not as they had confidentiality agreements preventing them from divulging any more information. George and I spent the rest of the afternoon and evening with these men as they bought numerous rounds of beer, food and expensive tequila by peeling off hundred dollar bills from a roll of US cash each carried in his pocket.

These managers from Budapest working for a US-based corporation exemplified a much larger phenomenon. US-based transnational corporations and businesses control and discipline their workers by threatening to lower their wages

with an inflow of cheap undocumented labor and by moving production facilities to areas where robust labor laws do not exist, causing workers to accept the lower wages.

According to a World Bank Report in 1991, Mexican poverty has persisted due to a lack of government investment in rural agricultural areas, an overinvestment in poverty programs for urban areas, and an unstable macroeconomic cycle (Santiago 1991). This lack of investment was partially the result of one-party rule in Mexico for nearly all of the 20th century that catered to Mexican elites at the expense of the poor under the guise of the Mexican revolution (Gledhill 2002). The ruling party in Mexico, the PRI, stayed in power because the memory of the chaos of the Mexican revolution remained and the fear of a return to those times caused many citizens to accept stability, despite an inequitable distribution of wealth, while the PRI set about intimidating those who would attempt to elect officials outside the party with violence and murder (Gledhill 1999). But Mexican poverty can also be attributed to Western development policies from the World Bank which favored urban renewal and a destruction of rural subsistence economies (Gledhill 1999). This may be partially because members of the PRI have been involved with Mexican drug cartels, which require rural land to grow their product. Still, US involvement in these arrangements remained, with US based capitalist entities such as Citibank and Merrill Lynch profiting by allowing deposit accounts of corrupt Mexican officials under false names to hide the extent of their corruption (Gledhill 1999). The US government assisted such arrangements by certifying corrupt officials as acting in compliance with the "War on Drugs", despite their involvement in the drug trade (Gledhill 1999). Thus,

although the corruption within the Mexican government and its institutionalized inequality created a situation in which Mexico's impoverished citizens needed to migrate, the US government and US based transnational corporations remained complicit and even facilitated the Mexican government corruption at the expense of poor Mexican citizens for their own economic benefit. Although these arrangements benefit elites in both countries, the effect on Mexico's poor is disproportionate and demonstrates yet another example of structural violence.

Several economists have correlated increases in migration with larger differentials of wages between the US and Mexico (Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999, Rivera-Batiz 1986). One study suggested that mechanisms such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) might help to alleviate migratory pressures by decreasing this wage differential (Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999), and this study concurs with the rhetoric of the US Clinton administration which implemented NAFTA in 1994 (US Department of Agriculture 2008). However, another economic study showed that these US operated *maquilladoras* on the Mexican side of the border actually created more immigration (Rivera-Batiz 1986) and yet another study suggested that NAFTA disproportionately benefited urban areas, while rural areas suffered further decline (Morales 1999), which inevitably led to more migration from these rural areas.

Many studies from other social scientific disciplines have documented the detrimental effects that NAFTA has had by economically undermining Mexican businesses and farms. With cheap US government subsidized corn flooding the

Mexican market after NAFTA, many Mexican farmers could no longer support their families through farming. This displaced many Mexicans from their traditional means of subsistence and caused more migrants to come to the US in search of wage labor (Andreas 1996, Andreas 1998, Chomsky & Dieterich 1999). Thus it would seem that NAFTA and the globalized free market have done little to alleviate migratory pressure and have in fact done more to increase it.

Free trade agreements have become a central tool in the exploitation of Third World populations, as well as the vast majority of people in the First World. In creating an economic apparatus outside the constructs of national and elected governments, First World transnational corporations have succeeded in transcending the laws of these governments. This success has translated into profit as labor laws, such as minimum wages, can easily be circumvented. Corporations accomplish this circumnavigation of US law by relocating production facilities to areas where such laws do not exist, particularly in border locations such as Juarez where US management can live in the US and work in Mexico. The passage of NAFTA between Mexico and the US has "been very beneficial for the rich in both countries and very harmful to the poor in both countries" (Chomsky & Dieterich 1999:98).

> In the United States, probably hundreds of thousands of reasonably well-paying jobs have been lost as transnational [corporation]s have simply shifted operations to Mexico where they can get far cheaper and more suppressed labor. That's not a benefit to Mexico which has also lost millions of jobs because the productive apparatus has collapsed. (Chomsky & Dieterich 1999:98)

The productive apparatus of Mexico has collapsed because US based transnational corporations have moved into Mexico displacing local productive capacity geared

toward the local economy in favor of foreign owned productive capacity geared toward export and increased profits. The volume of trade generated by these US factories in Mexico is enormous and these exports generate an impressive daily display daily at border crossings in El Paso.

## *International Commerce*

While crossing the border at the Bridge of the Americas in El Paso, the major crossing point for vehicles, I saw a long line of tractor-trailer trucks with Mexican plates waiting to get into the US. Several weeks earlier, US President George W. Bush had found a legal loophole allowing Mexican trucks into the US to honor and expand free trade despite opposition from the unusual coalition of the Republican right, the Teamsters Union and environmental groups (Holstege 2007). I decided to take a picture of the trucks and continued walking toward the bridge.

From the top of the bridge, I noticed that a few cars and trucks headed toward Mexico unimpeded while an absolutely astonishing line of trucks to get into the US extended along the bridge and back into Mexico. When I got to Juarez, I asked the taxi driver about the traffic waiting to get to the US. The line stood motionless extending south along Avenida Las Americas as far as I could see. He told me that it went back a mile or so but that it was stacked back several miles earlier in the day. The wait could be as much as four or five hours, he said.

According to the US Department of Transportation's Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 25 billion US dollars worth of US imports arrived via truck through the El Paso Port of Entry in 2007 (2008). The US and Mexico implemented NAFTA in 1993 but the US Department of Transportation does not supply pre-NAFTA data on imports at its web site. However, the 2007 figure represents a doubling of the US dollar value of truck imports from 1995 – calculated at just under 12 billion (2008). This would at

first suggest that the Mexican economy expanded, benefiting its citizens. However, NAFTA has benefited large US based transnational corporations far more.

> The point of forcing them to open up the barriers was to allow them to be taken over by transnational [corporation]s that export to foreign markets…More than half of businesses have suffered, but mainly smaller businesses…Mexico is exporting to the United States, but that's not because export industry has increased. It's because the domestic market has collapsed. (Chomsky & Dieterich 1999:98)

Mexican domestic markets have collapsed as employment in local industry has transformed into employment for transnational corporations. The corporations use the threat of moving production elsewhere, usually to parts of Asia where wages are often lower than they are in Mexico, to keep the Mexican workers from demanding fair wages and decent working conditions.

When my informant George first arrived in Juarez he worked for a *maquilla* doing paperwork. He was paid about ten cents for each invoice he processed for a US company. George stated the work was okay but to get to his job he had to take a company commuter bus at five in the morning. The bus drove around the city picking up workers for an eight o'clock start. They worked until five in the evening and then rode the bus home until nearly eight at night. He separated his shoulder riding a bicycle on dirt roads in a neighborhood near his girlfriend's house where dogs often ran loose and chased him. He did not have access to any health care and could not afford to see a doctor. He missed a day of work at the *maquilla* due to this injury and was subsequently fired for missing that one day. He made a bit less money waiting tables, but the hours were slightly better, six in the morning to six in the evening, and

he worked close to his residence. He also got two meals a day from the café owners. He described his life and that of most Mexicans as “a hand to mouth existence.”

The workers in Mexico cannot afford to buy the products they produce on the wages they are given and therefore all products must be exported to markets where there is “effective demand” (Schaeffer 2003:174). Essentially, people who lack effective demand cannot afford to purchase a commodity, even if they produced it. This ineffective consumption of those products requires corporations to move the product elsewhere in the global market, places where higher wages create effective demand – hence the number of trucks waiting to cross into the US. This creates a hierarchical economic system in which inexpensive labor is utilized in the Third World to export the products of their labor to the First World because the workers in the Third World are not paid the real value of their labor and therefore cannot afford to purchase what they have produced. Thus these free trade agreements are part of the broader implications of structural violence perpetrated against the poor in the name of increased profits.

## *Conclusion*

The functional economic history of the US-Mexican border is one of pervasive and consistent policies that have systematically disenfranchised the Mexican nation and its citizenry. From the takeover of Mexico's resource rich northern territories for a miniscule sum, including California and Texas, which as of 2005 both had Gross Domestic Products higher than Mexico (International Monetary Fund 2006, US Department of Commerce 2006), and the land appropriation by US Anglos of Hispanic ranches in those territories during the 19th and early 20th centuries; to the debt creation and perpetuation policies of US administered banks and the implementation of NAFTA in the late 20th century, US economic policies have functioned, intentionally or not, to consistently debilitate the Mexican economy and undermine the economic welfare of its current and former citizens while furthering US economic interests. This situation perpetrates structural violence against both the migrants themselves and Mexico as a whole, while allowing elites in both countries to benefit economically from the exploitation of their poorer working class citizens. Further, the neoliberal discourse teaches Mexicans to blame themselves for their economic problems, rather than analyze the ways in which US policies exploit them.

The data presented here suggests that US generated economic policies have effectively appropriated Mexico's productive capacity, economically disenfranchising its citizens, thus encouraging them to migrate to the US. This situation generated profits for US corporations as they received a labor force at reduced cost, either through "illegal" labor in the US or legal Mexican labor at border towns in Mexico.

The history of colonization, forced debt and free trade agreements, along with the military and legal functions of the border, effectively generated economic advantages for the US corporate productive apparatus by utilizing undocumented "illegal" migrant labor and utilizing cheaper Mexican labor just across the border at "US based" *maquillas*.

So, has anything changed at the border since the increase in militarization, the shifts in law and policy, and the restructuring of the border bureaucracies into the Department of Homeland Security, or do the same entities and actors benefit economically from the exploitation of Mexican labor? In the concluding chapter, I will demonstrate how US employers have previously benefited economically from these US Border policies and conclude with a discussion of how the situation has changed since the events of 9-11 with the increase in border militarization and legal structures described in the first chapters.

## V. Shifting Economic Benefits

In order to come to the US to find employment, Carlos traveled to Altar Sonora – the main staging ground for *coyote* smuggling through the Sonoran desert. After paying the required fee to the *coyote*, a smuggler specializing in human trafficking across the US-Mexican border, Carlos and about twenty others were put in a cargo van and driven to a point in the desert. From there they hiked following a guide for three days and two nights. On the second day Carlos put his head down on his backpack during a brief resting period. He heard a rattling and knew a snake was nearby. He got up and a large rattlesnake emerged from his backpack, nearly striking his face. On the following day, a young woman fell down dehydrated. The *coyote* wanted to leave her but Carlos and a few others assisted her for the remainder of the trip.

The danger inherent in these border crossings, and the structural violence caused by the border, becomes apparent in Carlos' story. He offered the information freely and proudly as though it were a testament to his and many others' courage and perseverance in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Although Carlos said that he had been told of these dangers before he endeavored to undertake this journey across the border, others he encountered along the trek had thought the trip would be a short jaunt across the border. Several migrants I spoke with during my research had very naïve impressions about the difficulties of crossing the border before they undertook the journey. Some knew of the inherent dangers before leaving, but decided they would go across as an adventure or out of sheer economic desperation, because they had few if any job prospects near their homes and no other way of feeding their

families. Many knew little about the journey, unaware that Tucson was nearly one hundred miles away, and Phoenix over two hundred miles away from the border across an inhospitable mountainous desert terrain. These migrants found themselves woefully unprepared for the odyssey.

One migrant I interviewed, Luis, related that a friend had falsely told him about a brief and easy crossing. Acting on the friend's advice at nineteen years of age, Luis crossed through the Sonoran desert. He had no idea of his location when he crossed the border, nor did he have any idea of the length of the journey because the *coyotes* did not tell him. He brought only a couple bottles of water and even less food before hiking across the desert with a group for 2 days and 1 night. He managed to survive the journey on the meager rations before arriving near a city, though many others did not. Migrant deaths due to dehydration have grown so commonplace in Southern Arizona that groups such as Humane Borders based in Tucson installed water stations along known migrant corridors in the Arizonan Sonoran Desert to prevent such tragedies. After Luis arrived in an unknown town, the *coyotes* put the migrants in a van and drove them to Oklahoma City, leaving them to their own devices. Luis decided to go to Colorado because he had heard of many opportunities for work there.

Many migrants I spoke with had similar tales of crossing the desert along the Arizona and California borders. The preferred border crossing points have shifted to these deserts for the past several years following increased militarization at towns and

major cities along the border. In a further attempt to suppress the numbers of migrants in 2006:

> The Senate Judiciary Committee approved a proposal that includes double and triple-fencing near Arizona cities and in part of the state's desert. In December, the House passed a bill calling for, among other steps against illegal migrants, some 700 miles of fencing along the 2,000 mile border. (CS Monitor 2006)

Supporters of this increase in militarization note that a "fence in San Diego County, approved by Congress in 1996, has dramatically reduced people and narcotics trafficking there, and allowed agents to refocus on problem areas" (CS Monitor 2006). But detractors of further militarization state:

> All fencing has done in recent years is shift the routes that illegal immigrants use to enter the United States — often with deadly results. Border Patrol spokesman Jose Garza told the Star in January that at least 217 illegal entrants died in the Tucson sector in the fiscal year that ended September 30…. Even proponents of border fencing find the piecemeal approach lacking. If you're going to build a fence, they say, make it a big one that runs the entire 2,300 miles of the border. "It's got to be continuous or (illegal entrants) will just go around it. (Arizona Star 2006)

However, without a massive military and economic effort on the scale of China's Great Wall including guard towers and manned outposts at frequent and regular intervals along the full two-thousand mile stretch, such a fence could and would be scaled nonetheless. In fact, Carlos stated proudly in the English he had recently learned "If they build a bigger fence, Mexicans will climb it!"

Other migrants I spoke with expressed similar sentiments toward the fence, though none as colorful as Carlos'. Many merely laughed at the idea that it would prevent future migrants from entering. With Carlos' defiance and others' amusement, I argue that a fence that spanned the entire US-Mexican border would likely be

ineffective at curtailing the economically desperate migrants – its stated intention. After all, a fence does nothing to address the root causes of economic migration detailed in the previous chapter. However, the building of this fence is a fabulous opportunity for government contractors to obtain large sums of US taxpayer dollars to build the fence and its accompanying surveillance devices.

During a conversation, anthropologist Josiah Heyman informed me that the US government gave contracts to build border fences, surveillance apparatuses and detention facilities to familiar corporate contractors including Boeing and KBR (personal communication, October 11, 2007). These collaborations of corporations, government bureaucracies and government officials form what is known as an 'Iron Triangle'. An iron triangle in government is when decision making in a particular policy area takes place between an interest group, a bureaucratic agency, and Congress with little or no outside input from members of the public, an interested oversight agency or even a president (Jordan 1981). Heyman speculated that there was likely a collaborative iron triangle between certain members of Congress, border bureaucracies and private companies to push through big militaristic projects at the border (personal communication, October 11, 2007).

When Carlos and the others in his smuggled group reached a small town after an arduous trek across the Sonoran Desert, they were transported by cargo van to Phoenix where they were left to fend for themselves. Carlos purchased a bus ticket to Central Florida where his uncle procured construction work for him the following week. Carlos was not the lone example of an undocumented migrant quickly finding

employment. Virtually all of the migrants I interviewed for this research found work in agriculture, construction and service industries within weeks of their arrival at a final destination point inside the United States.

For many years, a semi-permeable border arrangement that released undocumented migrants following their capture by Border Patrol (Heyman 1995), facilitated the desire of Mexican workers to obtain employment opportunities not afforded to them in their home country. Simultaneously, the structures of the global capitalist system allowed US businesses to benefit from the economic exploitation of these marginalized populations in the peripheral South. By utilizing the military and political structures of borders and nation-states and the economic structures of debt creation and perpetuation, as well as free trade agreements, US businesses continued the colonial project of exploitation and domination.

This arrangement has changed, however, after the events of 9-11 with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the restructuring of the border bureaucracies, the increase in militarization of the border and the accompanying legal and policy changes. As I mentioned briefly in the chapter on legal functions, recent crackdowns on employers who hire undocumented workers have become increasingly commonplace. An employer in the Houston area construction industry stated that he recently joked with some co-workers that some of their lower bid sub-contractors were probably hiring ‘illegal’ immigrants. His supervisor informed him that it was not acceptable even to joke about it because if ICE investigators deem that the company has any knowledge that their sub-contractors engage in illegal hiring practices, the

company's officers can face heavy fines or even prison time. This suggests that US employers are no longer the main beneficiaries of US border policy, which represents a functional change in the overall purpose of the border.

In this chapter, I will explore the economic benefits US employers have enjoyed from undocumented labor before moving on to describe some of the changes in the economic functions of the border since 9-11. I will argue that the border continues to serve as a benefit to the US economy – the beneficiaries have merely shifted from one group of employers (particularly in the agricultural, service and construction industries) to international corporations and conglomerates that benefit from US government contracts to further escalate the militarization of the US-Mexican border.

### *Benefits to US Employers*

An informant in Oregon told me Juan's story. Juan wanted to come to Oregon to marry his girlfriend and build a life in the United States. As his girlfriend was not a US citizen, she was unable to bring him to the US legally so she hired a smuggling ring to assist him with the migration. He showed up in Tijuana and was blindfolded and transported to several locations for several days. After arriving somewhere in the desert with many other migrants, Juan hiked for two days to get across the border. He did not have access to water on the second day and several people in the smuggling party were left behind. He now has scars from a cactus on his hand, which he cannot close entirely. After the hike he was transported to Los Angeles where various shuttles took the migrants to other locations. He arrived in Salem, Oregon via the smuggling ring for the sum of $2500.

Juan quickly found a job as a forklift operator on a farm near Salem. Juan was a licensed forklift operator in Mexico but made only several dollars a day. Despite the lack of a US forklift operators license, he was able to show that he could do that job at this farm and now makes $12 an hour. As licensed US trained forklift operators usually make twice that much, the arrangement benefited both parties.

Migrants who lack documentation within the US legal framework have little recourse but to accept employment at below market cost. Juan was not paid the market rate for his labor and was unable or unwilling to bargain for more money given his precarious legal status, even though he had a valuable skill which was in high demand.

Still, Juan made twice as much in an hour at below market cost in Oregon as he did in a day at the going market rate in Mexico.

Because many migrants lack valuable skills such as operating a forklift, making them less valuable to the US labor force, many US employers exploit them to a greater degree. The following examples illustrate how employers can exploit workers who migrate outside the legal system. Elisa worked at a restaurant after a *coyote* smuggled her from El Salvador to Portland, Oregon. Her family sent her because she could not find employment in El Salvador and the family needed regular income. The restaurant owner maintained a boarding house near the restaurant where she and a number of other workers lived. She received room and board but made less than minimum wage and the owner did not allow her to keep any of her tips. Elisa asked for a raise after six months and the owner fired her a week later telling her that another server would take her place. She returned to El Salvador shortly afterward. An undocumented Mexican migrant server named Isabel worked at another restaurant in Portland in an eerily similar situation – a boarding house, no tips and less than minimum wage employment. Isabel asked friends to help her find other work rather than asking for a raise as she could not survive if her employer fired her.

By placing these migrants outside US law, the US receives a labor force not subject to national minimum wage laws. This allows US economic interests to "both preserve welfare benefits for citizens," in this case US employers, "and exclude noncitizens," the Mexican migrants, "from the benefits of capitalist development" (Ong 2006:4). This means these 'unskilled' migrants must take the wage offered to

them, inevitably far lower than the market rate and sometimes lower than the mandated minimum. Michael Kearney notes that Mexican migrants "run scared all the time and are desperate to get work before they are apprehended and sent back to Mexico" therefore, "they accept whatever wage is offered and they work like fiends" (1991:128). Thus it becomes apparent that this system of undocumented labor creates considerable advantages for employers and can lead to worker exploitation. This illustrates again how the system perpetrates structural violence against these workers, particularly those with fewer marketable skills.

In addition to low-skilled undocumented migrants, Aihwa Ong further includes low-skill citizen workers in the groups of people exploited by neoliberalist economic policies, stating "Citizens who are deemed too complacent or lacking in neoliberal potential may be regarded as less-worthy subjects" (2006:16). The "neoliberal potential" Ong speaks of designates skills that global market capitalism currently deems valuable for its everyday business functioning. Neoliberal potential can be found in workers such as information technology professionals, which helps to explain why the US allowed sixty-five thousand H-1 visas for these skilled foreign workers in recent years (Bray 2008). Thus "Low-skill citizens and migrants become exceptions to neoliberal mechanisms and are constructed as excludable populations in transit" while "expatriate talents constitute a form of movable entitlement without formal citizenship" (Ong 2006:16). According to Ong, those with the privileges of education and expertise in certain fields and trades will not only gain preferential treatment in immigration policy and law, but will also gain preferential treatment and benefits "at

the expense of territorialized citizens" (2006:16). These territorialized citizens may even have equivalent expertise but US businesses hire the foreign experts as they constitute the less expensive labor in the global marketplace (Hafner & Preysman 2003). This situation creates animosity among US labor that now has to compete for lower wages with the new preferred immigrants that have neoliberal potential and inflames the anti-immigrant US public discourse. This discourse is often directed at the equally abused low-skilled migrant worker who has been rendered more openly visible by his/her 'illegality' in the US legal system, in conjunction with the justification for increased militarization. This situation disenfranchises low-skilled workers from both sides of the border, with low-skilled US citizen workers blaming their low-skilled counterparts from Mexico for their economic misfortunes, while skilled workers from any country reap economic benefits from neoliberal policies.

The economic exploitation of laborers outside the umbrella of US labor laws creates a discourse that leads to a divide and conquer philosophy. Although employers in the United States receive an inexpensive labor force, the competition from lower wage labor economically threatens US citizen workers. US policies devalue the rights of US citizen workers, in addition to committing structural violence against migrants. By creating a discourse that systematically demonizes undocumented migrants as 'illegals', the US creates a labor force not subject to the Federal Minimum Wage or any other labor laws. This means these migrants must take whatever wages employers offer them, inevitably far lower than the current market rate. As workers in the US can often barely survive on the minimum wages mandated by these laws, or even on he

going market rate for their labor, they cannot take jobs that fail to pay them these minimums and thus they cannot compete with a desperate migrant workforce willing to take anything offered to them. This situation inevitably creates a large amount of hostility among the US citizen working class toward these migrants. One blogger on an anti immigration website whose husband lost his job as a bricklayer stated "I am getting really sick of the Mexican Invasion costing so many jobs."

Anti-immigrant discourse due to job losses has a long history in the US (Chock 1991, Fetzer 2000). And although the military, legal and economic structures of the US allow this situation, the workers in the US often fail to acknowledge the structural violence against both the migrants and themselves and frequently prefer to target their anger on the migrants. They believe "Mexico encourages its 'riff-raff' population to 'simply move north'…to clamor for opportunities and benefits not available to them in their home countries" (Dougherty 2004:V). This discourse presupposes what Anderson referred to as imagined communities of Nation-ness or Ethnic-ness, perpetuated by "print capitalist communications" that gave rise to the first inklings of nationalism in the eighteenth century (1994:316). Without the imagined community of the US nation, populated with English speaking primarily Anglo residents, US anti-immigrant nationalists and the US government would have no social reason to construct the militarized border.

US anti-immigrant nationalists who espouse such views fail to acknowledge that the reason these migrants do not have opportunities or benefits in their home countries has to do with the economic inequity created by the structural violence of

colonialism and global capitalism perpetuated by the US government and its corporate sponsors for many years in order to suppress wages in the United States and economically disenfranchise the Mexican nation and its poorer citizens.

Thus many US employers desired immigrant labor and for many decades the US allowed this labor to be available. US Border Patrol released migrants to return voluntarily to Mexico, which the migrants might or might not do. Josiah Heyman referred to this arrangement as the "voluntary-departure complex" (1995: 270). This practice gave the appearance of border enforcement for US public consumption while the undocumented labor status of migrants allowed them to be exploited by US employers who faced few if any consequences for utilizing this 'illegal' labor (Stoddard 1976a, Stoddard 1976b, Heyman 1995, Heyman 2000).

Previous studies have suggested that the border and its support structures acted as a mechanism not to prevent migration, but to discipline migrants to work hard and accept low wages under threat of arrest and deportation to the benefit of US employers (Kearney 1991, Chang 2000), and this certainly appeared to be the case with several of the above accounts. And although the employers I interviewed from 2006 to 2008 may have benefited somewhat from an 'illegal' labor force in the form of lower wages and more productive workers, they routinely had difficulties finding labor and that labor was becoming increasingly expensive as well. This situation appeared to contradict many previous studies.

### *Changes in Policy toward US Employers*

A manager at a dairy farm near Salem, Oregon whom I interviewed in 2006 argued that Mexicans do the work that Anglo Americans do not want to do, that they worked harder doing physical labor in cases where most Anglos would complain and quit. He further asserted that most Mexicans were better qualified to do agricultural work because they learned how to farm growing up in villages in Mexico, whereas many Americans did not know the first thing about farm work. The Mexican farm workers he referred to were likely some of those who had been displaced by NAFTA and US economic policies discussed in the previous chapter.

The dairy farm manger stated that his dairy paid at least minimum wage to all its employees. He believed the practice of paying below minimum wage was not widespread, declaring "Workers without proper paperwork will probably not find employment." However, though he also stated that he believes all his workers have proper documentation, he could not be entirely sure because some laborers use falsified documents and social security numbers. He found US immigration law unclear on how to determine legality and stated that the system "is unwieldy and confusing." A restaurateur in Portland agreed, stating "It's difficult to tell, but if the documents look real you can't discriminate based on race. Besides, my Mexican employees do twice the amount of work that the others do."

In 2007, a scant five miles away from the US-Mexican border in Yuma, Arizona where many of the US winter crops grow, agricultural producers had even more labor problems. Wages for agricultural field workers rose two dollars an hour to

$8.50 and farmers there still needed double the number of workers to pick their winter harvests. These wage increases created price spikes in US grown vegetables causing an increase in imported vegetables, thus causing many farmers in the area to lose money as they competed with cheaper imports. Locals attributed the labor shortage to "a 40,000-person limit on the number of foreign guest workers allowed into the US [as well as] tighter borders that are discouraging illegal crossings" (Bowers 2007). The president of the Yuma Fresh vegetable association stated, "This country has got to get a successful immigration policy. We have work for people in Mexico who want work" (Bowers 2007).

Kat at *Derechos Humanos*, an immigrant rights organization based in Tucson, Arizona explained to me that an organization she had regular contact with that represented migrant farm workers in Yuma had seen drastic changes in the area. Agricultural operations in Yuma practically had to beg for workers due to massive labor shortages. The Yuma organization, *Campesinos de Fronteras*, reported to Kat that in past years hundreds of available farm workers would normally show up for the harvest season. Now farming operations got only a handful. Although they speculated that some migrants had gotten into more lucrative industries, such as construction and food service, they attributed the majority of the labor shortage to the increase in border enforcement.

This data led me to speculate that the access to undocumented labor US employers have enjoyed for many years has changed with the increase in border militarization since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the Unites States. Additionally,

new regulations have come into effect forcing the law upon employers as well. In 2005, the US House of Representatives passed a bill "that increases penalties for illegal immigration activities and requires employers to verify the legal status of their employees" (Abrams 2006). By 2008, a federal law was implemented that increased the maximum fines on employers to $16,000 for hiring undocumented immigrants (Michaels 2008). In Arizona, a state law went into effect in 2008 that suspended an employer's business license for 10 days for hiring an undocumented immigrant and revoked the company's business license permanently, shutting down the company, if they violated the law a second time (Fischer 2008). Many critics of these regulations "argued that it was futile to try to close the border when demand for low-wage workers in this country remains so strong" (Abrams 2006). Furthermore, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement increased its investigations of US companies possibly hiring undocumented workers including raids on Wal-Mart, Del Monte and Tyson foods in 2007 and 2008 (Groban 2008, ElAmin 2007). ICE no longer engages in merely fining the employers and is instead

> conducting lengthy criminal investigations that result in indictments of company owners, executives, managers and other company personnel involved in these illegal activities. Criminal charges include harboring illegal aliens, money laundering and/or knowingly hiring illegal aliens. These offenses can carry a potential 10-20 year prison sentence, plus forfeiture of all company assets and revenues utilized in this illegal activity. (Groban 2008)

With these new policies in place, employers are likely to become much more reticent in their hiring practices, which will increase their overall labor costs and adversely affect the lives of many undocumented migrants.

The Salem dairy farmer said that some other dairies in the area had suffered raids by ICE in early 2006 and that several employees were led away in handcuffs. ICE similarly raided a Del Monte Food Processing Plant in Portland, Oregon in June of 2007, arresting 170 employees and getting federal grand jury indictments alleging immigration, document fraud, and identity theft offenses against three individuals at the staffing company that hired the workers (ElAmin 2007). Thus it would seem that perhaps the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement is truly far more enforcement oriented than its predecessors, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and US Customs Service.

The dairy farmer believed that many Mexican farm workers would prefer to work in the United States for part of the year and return to Mexico during the off-season. He advocated “a systematic and safe procedure in place where willing workers and employers needing workers can get together legally.” He was in favor of changing the politics of the border in order to facilitate the contracts he engaged in with qualified workers. He needed qualified agricultural workers, and thought many Mexicans were more qualified due to their agricultural expertise. He argued that the current policies on migration “hurt farmers and farm workers alike.” He blamed the government for the problems, stating “Only the federal government can fix this problem, but they refuse to do so.”

Certain parties and economic entities have indeed benefited from increased militarization. Employers in agriculture, however, have not proven to be one of these beneficiaries. As I came to discover over the course of my research, factions within

the federal government had become increasingly involved with other corporate interests who would prefer to keep the system functioning as is.

### *Government Use of Undocumented Labor*

Although he lived in the United States since he was a small child, Antonio never became a US citizen. Still, Antonio joined the US Navy and served in Iraq. He found the experience disturbing and did not enjoy being on details where they pulled dead bodies from the river, but he thought that serving in the US military would automatically make him a citizen. A year after he left the Navy, ICE deported Antonio to Mexico after a traffic violation. I asked him if he had a hearing before his deportation and if his military service meant anything. He said that he did have a hearing and that his military service actually made it worse because impersonating a citizen to join the US military constituted a crime for a foreigner. They suggested he could have sold Navy property to Mexico, even though as he notes he did not. I then asked him how it was that the Navy failed to discover that he was not a citizen. He said the recruiter didn't ask him when he couldn't produce proper documents and he just put him through. He assumed they knew his legal status but needed bodies to fight in the war.

When I asked my brother, the US Army Officer, about the possibility of this practice he confirmed that the US military will overlook citizenship at first but that if the person serving neglects to take an active step to apply for citizenship, they do not automatically become a citizen. He knew of one Italian who was currently in the process. The practice of utilizing foreigners to fight in the US military has a long tradition dating back to the Revolutionary War (Bender 2006). With fewer and fewer American citizens willing to join the armed services, heavy commitments of American

military forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and US soldiers defecting to better paying military contracting companies in what my brother informed me is known as "Going Blackwater," the US military has a serious need of bodies. Due to this military labor shortage, the Pentagon has lobbied to relax rules for undocumented migrants to join the US military offering expedited citizenship to attract recruits (Bender 2006). Also, with the current US military need for soldiers to fight in foreign combat zones, questionable practices regarding the recruiting of undocumented migrants have become an issue. One Marine recruiter sold false identification documents to over 20 undocumented migrants, thus allowing them to enlist, for a sum of $250 apiece (Gillison 2005). Despite my initial skepticism of Antonio's story, it would seem as though the US military practice of utilizing undocumented labor is more than just Antonio's isolated account. Accordingly, prospective migrants can risk their lives coming across the border in the desert, or risk their lives fighting a war for the United States, but neither guarantees them the right to stay in the United States following these dangerous activities.

Although the use of undocumented labor in the US military may seem reasonable given the military situations in President Bush's War on Terror, other government entities seem to utilize undocumented labor as well. When I got on the bus bound for Tucson in El Paso, I prepared to catch up on research notes. Then a middle aged Anglo man with a copy of Time magazine and a Wall Street Journal newspaper sat next to me. Someone reading the Wall Street Journal on a Greyhound bus seemed highly unusual. We rode out of the station and along the border highway

for several miles to the west. The border fence extended out to the city limits and several black choppers buzzed along the river valley. As we headed out of town, I noticed there were several mining operations on both sides of the border, but mainly on the American side.

My neighbor and I began chatting. The man explained that he was recently released from the Federal Prison in El Paso after serving time for a marijuana distribution violation. He believed that the federal prison population in El Paso consisted of roughly 70-80% 'illegals' who were serving time before deportation. He said that these 'illegals' were being used as labor to outfit border patrol vehicles. "They could legally pay them 40 cents an hour" he said. "The US labor was $1.50 an hour." I must have looked shocked. "Ironic isn't it?" he said with a grin raising his eyebrows. Even at only 40 cents an hour, he reasoned that with their living expenses paid for and an ability to send money home, these prisoners had it better than they would in Mexico. He knew of several would-be Mexican migrant prisoners incarcerated at the prison more than once, suggesting that if they failed to avoid US Border Patrol, they preferred detention to their job prospects at home.

Although we had not crossed the border literally at all, US Customs and Border Protection stopped us at the Anthony Port of Entry border station outside El Paso on Interstate-10. As we pulled in the man looked at several white and green border patrol jeeps and pointed. "That's what they were doing. Those jeeps would come in all white and they'd come through on an assembly line and the Mexican laborers would put the stickers on 'em and outfit 'em with radios and electronics."

I found few if any mass media or academic accounts of such events readily available and so I attempted to uncover documentation to verify this man's claims. US Customs and Border Protection listed a government run company called UNICOR once in its Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2007. The report states "Intragovernmental advances and prepayments as of September 30, 2007 and 2006, totaling $211.2 and $174.5 million respectively, consist of advances to UNICOR for vehicle purchases" (2007a). UNICOR, also known as Federal Prison Industries or FPI, is "a wholly-owned corporation of the United States Government [and] has operated factories and employed inmates in America's Federal prisons" since 1934 (Roberts 2008). Prisoners in these factories are required to be paid "the prevailing wage rate" and the corporation "must demonstrate that inmates will not displace free labor" (Garvey 1998:372). However, UNICOR

> must also make specified deductions from an inmate's wages. These deductions, which can total up to 80% of the inmate's gross wage, can be used for room and board, federal and state taxes, family support, and contributions to victim compensation funds. The inmate gets what's left over. (Garvey 1998:372)

This arrangement allows the government to receive services in exchange for housing prisoners, thus decreasing overall costs. Whether UNICOR could indeed pay non-US citizen prisoners less was unclear and representatives at UNICOR, US Customs and Border Protection, and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement did not comment on the matter when I contacted them. Their lack of comment and documentation on this claim may suggest that they likely did pay deported labor less through some legal loophole, as they would have no reason to hide it if they could not to do so, which

makes my brief travel companion's story much more plausible. Thus it would appear as though the industry of policing the border may also be prone to running on cheap undocumented labor.

Although some US employers and the US government benefit economically by exploiting undocumented labor, there are further economic benefits to border militarization. Government contractors have a large financial stake in keeping the border militarized, and this financial stake has grown since the terrorist attacks of 9-11 as I will demonstrate in the next section.

## *Corporate Contractors*

While staying at a hostel during research in El Paso, I woke up one morning at about 4:30 am. I could not sleep any longer because mosquitoes kept buzzing in my ears. I got up turned on the light and vengefully killed 3 lethargic, blood-filled bugs. Groggy, I proceeded downstairs to the lobby for a 50 cent cup of Folgers in a Styrofoam cup before stumbling outside.

As I sat outside on the bench drinking my coffee and having a smoke, a bus pulled up to the building next door at about 5:30 am. The side of the bus read "Wackenhut Transportation Division." It appeared to be a prison bus with fencing on the windows. The driver got out and someone buzzed him into the building. The building appeared nondescript with no words, only numbers on the front. I got up and walked around the building to see what I could find but saw no sign of its purpose. When I peered into the bus it looked empty. After about 20 minutes the driver in uniform led a young Hispanic boy out of the building and onto the bus. The boy wore a paper hospital mask around his nose and mouth. The boy had no handcuffs but the driver held his arm and led him onto the bus. The bus then pulled away and headed toward the freeway. Shortly thereafter, the morning hotel clerk showed up and sat outside with me to smoke. I asked him about the building next door. He told me that the building housed kids from Central and South America who got caught crossing the border and were scheduled for deportation.

Wackenhut had popped up during several internet searches I performed while doing preliminary research on my way to El Paso. After observing this incident, I

became curious about the company so I decided to do some investigating. According to its website, "Wackenhut Corporation is the leading provider of quality, customer focused security solutions in the United States. The company provides its industry-leading integrated security and related services to local, regional and national customers" (G4S Wackenhut 2008a). Wackenhut has divisions in several government related industries including "Security Services, Nuclear Security and Energy Consulting Services, Government Services, and Consulting and Investigations" (G4S Wackenhut Website 2008a). Thus Wackenhut is a large multi-faceted organization involved in numerous government security projects with a large stake in how those projects, including the border, operate.

Wackenhut's Transportation Division touts itself as "the most secure and most cost effective transportation system available today… providing the criminal justice community the safest, most secure and humane transport of prisoners, offenders and illegal aliens with the highest degree of integrity and accountability" (G4S Wackenhut website 2008b). US Customs and Border Protection utilizes Wackenhut's Transportation Services to transport detainees.

> Since October 2006, Wackenhut has been providing transportation services to CBP along the Southwest Border, including San Diego, El Centro, El Paso, Yuma, Tucson, Marfa, Del Rio, Laredo and Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol Sectors. Services provided by Wackenhut include ground transportation services, courtroom transportation, security services and other related transportation and guard services. (US Customs and Border Protection 2007b)

CBP renewed their contract with Wackenhut in 2007 with a CBP representative stating "Detainee transportation is a critical component of the Secure Border Initiative. The transportation contract with Wackenhut will continue to be a force multiplier on

the Southwest Border, enabling officers and agents to perform their priority law enforcement activities" (US Customs and Border Protection 2007b). Thus the Wackenhut Corporation has become the primary institution that US Customs and Border Protection uses to transport migrants, which frees CBP to enforce the laws of the border, which in turn generates more business for Wackenhut.

Wackenhut is accordingly heavily involved with the border enforcement apparatus. According to the CBP website, "Wackenhut transported over 580,000 detainees and freed up over 600,000 hours for CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents to perform their primary law enforcement and investigative duties" in the fiscal year 2007 (US Customs and Border Protection 2007b). This allows the CBP to "better coordinate the detention and removal of detainees in CBP's custody" (US Customs and Border Protection 2007b). This justification for the utilization of a private corporation to perform the government's duties neglects to inform us why the CBP does not simply create its own transportation division.

Moreover, this business arrangement grew further problematic given the fact that in "March 2002, The Wackenhut Corporation (TWC) merged with Group 4 Falck, a Danish owned security conglomerate" (Wackenhut Services, Inc. 2008:2). This means that US tax dollars paid for border enforcement to a foreign owned corporation. The merger caused Wackenhut and its subsidiaries "to come under the DOE's Foreign Ownership Control, Influence Program" which means that "if a company is owned, controlled, or influenced by foreign persons it is considered a potential threat to National Security" (Wackenhut Services, Inc. 2008:2). It would seem likely that

Wackenhut's relationship with CBP coalesced in one of the 'Iron Triangle's' Josiah Heyman spoke about (personal communication, October 11, 2007).

Heyman also noted that Boeing acquired a huge government contract to create a "virtual fence" of surveillance cameras at the Arizona border (personal communication, October 11, 2007). CNN reported in 2007 that that fence was

> scheduled for its grand debut in June, July, August. It's now September. And the program is still not ready…communication glitches, border cameras that don't focus automatically, and fuzzy video connections in bad weather are just some of the problems plaguing the system. (CNN 2007)

The Department of Homeland Security had already paid Boeing $15 million by September of 2007, roughly three-fourths of the contract amount, but because of these technical issues "Secretary Michael Chertoff told a congressional committee, he's withholding the final payment until testing shows it works" (CNN 2007).

Because of the money involved in the contract, Heyman thought that Boeing would find a way to get the full payment (personal communication, October 11, 2007). The Washington Post reported in 2008 that "technical problems discovered" in the project delayed its scheduled completion by at least three years (Hsu 2008), even though the same project had technical problems the previous year according to the CNN report (2007). According to the Post, the project also had new problems that included "Boeing's use of inappropriate commercial software, designed for use by police dispatchers, to integrate data related to illicit border-crossings" (Hsu 2008). Still, "Boeing ha[d] already been paid $20.6 million for the pilot project, and in December [2007], the DHS gave the firm another $65 million to replace the software with military-style, battle management software" (Hsu 2008). Thus it would appear as

though Boeing managed to expand the contract and received more tax dollars than it would have for an on-time, successful project.

In addition to these US taxpayer-funded contracts to Boeing and Wackenhut, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement awarded a contingency contract worth up to $385 million dollars in 2006 to former Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown and Root. The contract “provides for establishing temporary detention and processing capabilities to expand existing ICE Detention and Removal Operations Program facilities in the event of an emergency influx of immigrants into the U.S.” (Hunt 2006). The US Department of Homeland Security would decide just when that ‘emergency’ occurred, but in the meantime KBR receives over $450,000 every year to cover “administrative costs” (Vlahos 2006). As one commentator pointed out, “Contingency support contracts are good business for KBR, which provides insurance for calamities that don't happen” (Richey 2006). KBR receives nearly half a million taxpayer dollars every year just for being ready to provide detention facilities in the event of an immigration emergency, whatever that ‘emergency’ might be.

These and other private government contractors generate healthy profits to build and maintain militarized structures along the border at US taxpayer expense. Members of the US Congress and the border bureaucracies collude with these corporate contractors to extract more money for pet projects and to maintain their budgets, forming Iron Triangles generally outside the public sphere of information. The public, meanwhile, remains ill informed of these arrangements as exemplified by the lack of news articles on these issues. This situation allows congresspersons the

political will to collaborate with these corporate contractors to fund such projects, and thus the situation is likely to continue indefinitely.

## *Conclusion*

Although US employers have long enjoyed the economic spoils of US policies toward Mexico and its citizenry, that situation is changing. In addition to increased border militarization and new regulations, fines and prosecutions of employers in violation of US law for hiring undocumented workers have begun to shift the economic benefits of border policy away from the former group of employers to new beneficiaries. US government entities, including the one tasked to police the border, appear to be one of the latest beneficiaries of undocumented migrant labor. Further, the increased militarization of the border since 9-11 has allowed new Iron Triangles to form between corporate contractors and the border bureaucracies that they are serving. These Iron Triangles benefit corporate US government defense contractors with taxpayer donations for their border militarization projects, some of which do not work and others that benefit corporate entities for events that may never be declared.

This shift in US economic beneficiaries represents a functional change at the border. No longer do small, medium or even large US employers in agriculture, construction and service industries regularly enjoy the benefits of low wages from undocumented labor due to the increased border enforcement and the simultaneous crackdown on their hiring practices. Instead agricultural employers are desperate to find workers – whether qualified or not – while companies like Wal Mart and Del Monte will likely have to offer higher wages in order to attract legal employees. In concurrence with this economic misfortune of many US businesses, corporations with ties to the US government sponsored military industrial complex enjoy government

contracts allegedly related to keeping undocumented migrants from crossing the border – contracts which depend nonetheless on migrants crossing the border for continued funding. The US economy is therefore still benefiting from undocumented migrant labor, but the benefit goes to a select few defense contractors in an alleged attempt to secure the homeland, rather than the broader US agricultural and service industries.

## VI. Conclusion

The international border between the US and Mexico, along with its accompanying policies and apparatuses, has effectively benefited US economic interests at the expense of Mexico and its citizens since the border's inception in the mid 19th century. The appropriation of Mexican lands, the debilitating debts owed by the Mexican government and its people to US banking interests, and the free trade agreements negotiated in US interests have all served to undermine Mexico's productive capacities and effective consumer demand to create a migration that enriches various US interests. From its onset, the border has likewise become increasingly militarized and this militarization has entered a phase of rapid expansion in the years following 9-11-01. In this thesis I have argued that the US interests that benefit from the increasingly militarized border shift periodically with changes in policies and procedures related to the functioning of the border structure. The evidence described in this thesis suggests that the functions and benefits of the border appear to have shifted in the years following 9-11-01. It remains to be seen if this shift will be permanent, justified by perceived threats posed by globalization such as international terrorism, or if it merely represents a temporary change in policy from a US administration heavily invested in the defense industry and a US public still panicked from the attacks of 9-11-01 and focused on maintaining homeland security from all foreigners at any cost. Regardless of the eventual outcome of this functional and structural shift, this thesis constitutes an historical contribution to the ongoing debates of border studies and to the broader fields of economic and political anthropology, as

well as the anthropology of violence associated with social and institutionalized inequity, particularly within the study of the international division of labor.

This thesis has described the increased fencing, electronic surveillance, patrols and arrests at the US-Mexican border that represent an increasing militarization of the border since the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. It has further demonstrated some of the negative effects and structural violence this increased militarization has had on a variety of populations, most notably on the migrants themselves, but also on many US citizens. This discussion contributes to the ongoing debates regarding globalization, transnationalism, and states of exception in modern neoliberal states, especially in a socio-political and economic anthropological context. The patrols and surveillance activities at the border work to create an authoritarian panoptic gaze, which forces migrants and US citizens alike to discipline themselves and to defer to the power and supremacy of the US hegemonic enforcement apparatus. The spectacle produced during the implementation of the panoptic border structure works in conjunction with it to generate an overwhelming theatrical display of control over the border region and its people – on both sides of the border. In merging these tactics with the combined might of a number of US-taxpayer-funded institutions, including local police forces, border enforcement agencies and the US military, US policy has succeeded in generating amongst the people of the region a pervasive climate of fear, intimidation, discipline and deference to the panoptic border entity it has created, inflicting structural violence upon the less fortunate members of the global capitalist hierarchy.

Still, the policies and procedures associated with the panoptic border spectacle do little to accomplish their stated goal of preventing undocumented migration and migrants continue to come to the US. I argue that the panoptic border spectacle works in conjunction with legal states of exception and states of expansion to encourage the very activities it claims to work to prevent. In suspending certain laws and expanding others beyond their intended functions, the policies in place in the latter part of the first decade of the new millennium have served to justify further military expansion and encroachment into the everyday lives of border residents on both sides. As US law creates the undocumented migrant, then manufactures the migrant as illegal, it generates a discourse of illegality that suggests an ease of migrating legally, forcing the onus of responsibility for illegality on the creation rather than creator. This discourse and the visibility of illegality in a racialized and nationalized form aid the US in the expansion of the militaristic panoptic border spectacle. I have outlined many of these legal changes including legal exceptions and legal expansions within the current neoliberal transformations in state relationships with citizens and non-citizens alike. I have also illustrated how the law works in conjunction with other political, economic and military functions to perpetrate structural violence against migrants and disenfranchise US citizens. These considerations contribute to the ongoing discourse regarding the inequities inherent in the global capitalist system within an anthropological framework, particularly in political and economic anthropology.

Additionally with this thesis, I have revealed a number of questionable US government contracts and practices that have rarely found their way into the general

sphere of public knowledge. Many of these militaristic and legal states of expansion related to these contracts and practices have come at great expense to US taxpayers and businesses, as well as individual freedoms and sometimes even capitalist market forces. As many US employers want or need Mexicans to work for them, and many Mexicans want work in the US, recent US border policies have not worked for migrants, employers or the US taxpaying public. In fact these states of exception and expansion served to accomplish little beyond enriching corporations involved in military and defense contracts. Migrants continue to come to the US outside the legal system and although many US industries once reaped the benefits of undocumented migration, this situation has changed quite drastically through the decade following 9-11. With political iron triangles forming between the border bureaucracies, corporate actors poised to profit from militaristic border policies, and perhaps a few collaborative and influential politicians, the economic benefits of the US-Mexican border have been co-opted by larger multinational corporations who profit from US taxpayer funding as opposed to smaller US employers involved in labor exploitation. Thus the US-Mexican border not only functions to commit structural violence against undocumented migrants, it serves also to generate corporate profit for the military and defense industries.

This thesis has also addressed some of the structural violence perpetrated against undocumented migrants, and in many cases US citizens, by US government policies and procedures. Future research might fruitfully explore the motivations and agency of immigrants to better understand their responses and resistance to US

policies and even shifts in these policies. This line of research would allow for a more nuanced approach as well as an understanding of the role of resistance and human agency within the context of the US-Mexican border. The structural violence perpetrated against Mexico and particularly its border residents remains fertile ground for research. Although I discussed many issues concerning migrants, deported migrants and US citizens, future research could address a number of issues concerning Mexican border residents.

While in Juarez and Nogales, I constantly found myself exposed to a variety of harmful social phenomenon directly created and perpetuated by US border policy. Two of the most prominent of these issues concerned the sex trade and the trade in illicit drugs. While I was eating in Nogales, Sonora, a short young woman in camouflage pants and white spaghetti strap shirt with her mid-section exposed came over to my table. Her rounded belly appeared larger than her scant frame and I surmised that she was pregnant. She sat down at the table and a man I was chatting with left claiming he needed to get some food. The woman smiled at me and asked if I needed a *senorita*.

"*No gracias, tengo una esposa. Lo siento* (No thanks, I have a wife. Sorry)," I replied.

She looked disappointed but I smiled and she smiled back. We chatted for a minute. She was from Monterrey and had moved to Nogales as a teenager. I did not ask her why. After a short period of silence, she waved goodbye and moved over to

the bar to talk to older Anglo man. Several other scantily clad women were around him and he appeared to revel in the attention.

The above scene describes merely one instance among many along the border in which a woman solicited me as a potential sex tourist. As soon as I crossed the border, taxi drivers called out in broad daylight asking if I wanted to meet some girls. In nearly every bar and restaurant I patronized along the Mexican side of the border, a woman approached me asking if I would like to buy them a drink, go to a hotel or if I needed a *senorita*. In previous trips to Mexico, well south of the border, I had not experienced this phenomenon on such an overwhelming scale. This geographic disparity of socio-cultural phenomena might suggest that the socio-economic disparities between the US and Mexico, as well as US border policy, exacerbate or even generate these kinds of socio-cultural phenomena. As the US treats Mexico subserviently in economic, military and political matters, US citizens may become conditioned to behave similarly toward Mexican citizens. Many male US citizens see Mexico as a place to frequent for sex tourism and I first heard of this phenomenon in southern California from some co-workers who took frequent trips to Tijuana for that very purpose. This political power imbalance may lead to the overwhelming number of US sex tourists at the border who can be seen wandering in and out of massage parlors at all hours near the border. This appears to be fertile ground for research, as one could explore how the behavior of the government of a nation state toward a less powerful neighbor influences the personal behavior of its citizens toward those citizens of a less powerful nation state. I have observed the behavior of Americans,

Canadians, Australians and Europeans toward Mexicans, Guatemalans, Belizeans, and Moroccans in the latter's native states and found that the Westerners often treat the natives as inferior or somehow lesser than themselves, perhaps without even realizing it. Is this merely a remnant of colonial heritage? Does the economic superiority of a nation-state suggest to its citizens that they themselves are superior to those citizens who have been economically disenfranchised by global capitalism? Or is it perhaps a part of the overall cultural experience of Westerners indoctrination into the discourse of superior nationalistic ideologies? Are there other implications surrounding these behaviors? These questions contain profound anthropological implications regarding the inequities inherent in the global capitalist system, as well as the anthropology of violence associated with this institutionalized inequity, as I have discussed throughout this thesis.

Still, prostitution was hardly the only, nor even the most prevalent social malady afflicting Mexican border residents. On another occasion in Juarez, I walked into the core downtown area near Avenida Juarez with my informants George and Felix. George continued to point out drug dealers along the way. Felix found one he went to often and bought a piece attaching it to the pin on his tie. He told me that the police never check there. He asked George if he wanted some.

George replied, "You know I only do it at home where I feel safe, man."

He further explained that he only bought from one particular place because he was paranoid about getting caught.

At the end of the evening, George and I walked out of the downtown area and into the more empty streets near the market. As we got closer to the hotel George lived at he said he needed to stop somewhere. We got to a doorway and he turned and went in.

I said I'd wait outside and he said, "No, you should see this."

I reluctantly agreed. We went through a doorway and into a small courtyard. George knocked on a window. A woman holding a crying infant was standing next to a doorway close by. George asked to buy one and a man from behind the curtain said it had to be two. He sighed and handed 10 US dollars to a hand behind the curtain. The hand gave him two small baggies. We left as I looked at the woman with the baby.

I reminded George that ten dollars was roughly one day of his rent.

He acknowledged that it was a pricey habit but explained, "There's nothing here but work, man. People have few friends and there's no one you can trust. It's just something to escape for a little while."

The US War on Drugs represents another policy, like border policy, that has failed to accomplish its stated goals. Drugs have remained a constant in US society with periodic ebbs and flows in usage both before and after the war's onset in the 1980s, thus suggesting the war has had little effect in the US other than making it more difficult to import drugs and therefore more lucrative for smugglers, which encourages more violence, and more expensive for users, which further impoverishes the desperate who need an escape.

According to several of my sources in El Paso and Juarez, drug use in Mexico has skyrocketed concurrently with the US War on Drugs. One well connected informant said that the drugs come from the south, usually Puerto Vallarta where they might have been shipped from Columbia or other countries. He said he had done pickups there for a relative before, and sometimes in Sinaloa. My informant said that a bag of cocaine in Juarez was about twice as expensive as it was in Sinaloa or Puerto Vallarta and about half as much as it would be in New York. Thus, there was a profit motive to move the drugs across the border, but the drug runners had already doubled their money just by bringing the drugs to Juarez. The border held the drugs in Juarez to some degree and this created a huge surplus of product in Juarez that dealers then marketed to its downtrodden residents. Given the despair of many people in Juarez, including Felix and George, it was likely a fairly easy market to sell in.

The social, economic and political effects of this explosion in the drug trade and in drug use by Mexican border residents represent opportunities for future anthropological research. Since the election on Felipe Calderón in 2006, the Mexican government has engaged in a struggle with Mexican drug cartels that have divided communities, particularly those where drug cartels funded public works programs, and left many citizens and law enforcement officials dead (Beith 2008, Campbell 2008). It would be interesting to explore this issue, and particularly to discover if Calderón was at all influenced by the US in his decision to wage this destructive, controversial and difficult conflict. Such a study would contribute to ongoing debates in political and economic anthropology regarding the role of policy between ‘first’ and ‘third’ world

nation states within the context of development discourse. A study in this area might also yield further information regarding individual psychologies and the effects of neoliberal discourses and policies toward the marginalized populations of the global capitalist system and their responses to these policies within the context of the anthropology of violence. Such a study would however involve a great deal of danger, as many Mexican journalists who attempted to cover the issue often ended up seeking asylum in the US for fear of their lives (Associated Press 2008a).

A final less legally precarious and physically hazardous avenue of study to pursue concerns the issue of deported Mexican nationals who grew up in the United States and their lack of belonging to any country. Several migrants I interviewed had spent a significant portion of their youth in the US and had an extremely difficult time adjusting to life in Mexico. On my final night in Juarez with my informant George, I discovered just how difficult his adjustment to becoming a Mexican citizen in Mexico had been.

When we finally arrived at the place Felix wanted us to see, we got to the entrance and were searched for weapons. We then headed downstairs from street level into a large hall. On a wooden bench at the bottom of the stairs, several dozen scantily clad young women sat chatting, smoking or just staring into space. To the right rested a number of plastic tables and chairs where older men sat and drank with one another or with a young woman. At the center of the hall sat a stage where some of the men danced with some of the women.

Felix had a table brought over to the edge of the stage along with some chairs and a plastic crate full of ice, large bottles of beer called *caguamas* and three plastic cups.

George turned to me and said, “I don’t think we can drink all that.”

“I don’t either,” I replied.

George turned to Felix and said something to him. I couldn’t hear what he said with the music blaring so loudly. Felix looked as though he was assuring George that everything would be fine. I looked over to the table next to us. A large tough-looking man wearing some silver jewelry and a button down shirt showing an extremely hairy chest grabbed a *caguama* in his stout hand and poured the beer into his mouth. He then put his arms around two young women while dancing with a third. Two of the young women looked highly disinterested. George turned back toward me and told me the women were not prostitutes. The mainly older men apparently paid four pesos ($.40) to the women for a dance.

“Isn’t that sort of sad,” he said.

“What?” I asked.

“These young girls having to work here, probably to feed their kids, dancing with these old fat men for forty cents a dance. I mean look at their faces. They’re not enjoying themselves.”

I looked. Only a few of the twenty or so on the dance floor looked happy.

“Most of these guys probably have hard-ons they’re poking into them on top of it. It’s sad really,” said George.

"Well these guys are pretty sad too," I said. "I mean they must be lonely to come here to do this."

George laughed. "There's a saying in Mexico. Who's the bigger ass, the mule or the guy driving him?"

He explained that mule drivers generally wander around and pick up other people's garbage to use. The mules should be pitied for having to do this, but so should the drivers.

Felix busied himself fraternizing with the women and some other people he knew while George and I chatted. Felix came back with a woman that George had indicated he thought was attractive. Felix knew her of course, and gave her some money to sit with George, as George did not know how to dance. George talked to her for a while and bought her a rose when a peddler stopped at our table. I could not hear the conversation due to the music. The young woman got up and left the table after ten or fifteen minutes. George told me that she said she was eighteen years old and had two kids she supported.

"Can you believe that! Eighteen years old and two kids," he remarked.

I asked why she left.

George said, "I don't know. Women in Mexico don't seem to like me much. Maybe I'm not macho enough or something. I don't know, but they have a word for me down here. *Pocho*. It means all chopped up. It's a slang word they use for people like me who have been deported and grew up in the states and can't speak Spanish

well and don't know the Mexican culture or how to act. I'm *Pocho* because I don't really belong anywhere."

## VII. References Cited

Abrams, Jim
2006 Senate Closer on Immigrant Worker Proposal. Associated Press, March 16. Electronic document, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060316/ap_on_go_co/immigration

Agamben, Giorgio
2005 State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government. Kevin Attell, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Alvarez, Robert R. Jr
1995 The Mexican-US Border: The Making of an Anthropology of Borderlands. Annual Review of Anthropology 24:447-470.

Anderson, Benedict
1991 Imagined Communities. Verso/New Left Books.
1994 Exodus. Critical Inquiry 20(2):314-327.

Andreas, Peter
1996 U. S.: Mexico: Open Markets, Closed Border. Foreign Policy 103:51-69.
1998 The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era. Political Science Quarterly 113(4):591-615.

Appadurai, Arjun.
1996 Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Arizona Star
2006 Border Fence is Lousy Fix for Complex Problem. Arizona Star, March 13. Electronic document, http://www.azstarnet.com/allheadlines/119519

Associated Press
2008a Asylum-seekers desperate for U.S. protection: Sharp spike in applications from border areas hit by drug-cartel violence. Published at msnbc.com, July 11. Electronic document, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25644638/
2008b Illegal Immigrants Hush Up: They are Invoking the Right to Remain Silent to Avoid Deportation. Published in The Sierra Vista Herald, February 25.

Baker, Bryan C.
2007 Trends in Naturalization Rates. US Department of Homeland Security. Electronic document, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ntz_rates508.pdf

Bailey, Dominic
2005 (September 29) EU Outposts turn into Fortresses. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4294426.stm

Balibar, Etienne and Erin M. Williams
2002 World Borders, Political Borders *In* Criticism in Translation. PMLA-Special Topic: Mobile Citizens, Media States 117(1):71-78.

BBC News
2005 Record Deaths on US-Mexico Border. BBC News, October 4. Electronic document, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4307380.stm
2005 African Migrant Tales from Melilla. BBC News, October 14. Electronic document, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4343790.stm
2005 Crossing Deserts, Scaling Fences. BBC News, October 12. Electronic document, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4332512.stm
2005 African Migrants left in Desert. BBC News, October 7. Electronic document, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4319828.stm
2005 Six Killed Near Spain's Enclave. BBC News, October 6. Electronic document, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4316702.stm
2005 Record deaths on US-Mexico border. BBC News, October 4. Electronic document, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4307380.stm
2005 Regions and Territories: Ceuta, Mellila. BBC News, September 3. Electronic document, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/4209538.stm
2007 Mexican Anger Over US Trespass. BBC News, February 23.

Bodega, Isabel, Juan A. Cebrian, Teresa Franchini, Gloria Lora-Tamayo, Asuncion Martin-Lou
1995 Recent Migrations from Morocco to Spain. International Migration Review 29(3):800-819.

Beith, Malcolm
2008 Tough Habit to Break: In Mexico's war on drugs, the government faces entrenched support for crime bosses in some poor communities. Newsweek, June 12. Electronic document, http://www.newsweek.com/id/141227

Bender, Bryan
2006 Military Considers Recruiting Foreigners: Expedited Citizenship Would be an Incentive. Boston Globe, December 26.

Bernard, H. Russell
2006 Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, fourth edition. New York: Altamira Press.

Bowers, Faye
2007 Along US-Mexico Border, Not Enough Hands for the Harvest. Christian Science Monitor, February 22. Electronic document, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0222/p02s01-usec.html

Bray, Hiawatha
2008 Firms find skilled-worker visas too hard to get. Boston Globe, March 24. Electronic document, http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2008/03/24/firms_find_skilled_worker_visas_too_hard_to_get/

Campbell, Monica
2008 Bling Bang: A secret museum in Mexico City chronicles the country's war on drugs, and serves as a teaching tool for counternarcotic agents in training. Newsweek, June 19. Electronic document, http://www.newsweek.com/id/142237

Chang, Grace
2000 Disposable Domestics: Immigrant Women Workers in the Global Economy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: South End Press.

Chavez, Leo R.
1992 Shadowed Lives: Undocumented Immigrants in American Society. Fort Worth, Tx and Orlando, Fl: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.

Chock, Phyllis Pease
1991 "Illegal Aliens" and "Opportunity": Myth-Making in Congressional Testimony "Illegal Aliens" and "Opportunity": Myth-Making in Congressional Testimony. American Ethnologist 18(2): 279-294.

Chomsky, Noam, and Heinz Dieterich
1999 Latin America: From Colonization to Globalization. Melbourne: Ocean Press.

Christian Science Monitor
2006 Border Fence: Symptom of a Failed Policy. March 14. Electronic document, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0314/p08s02-comv.html

City-Data.com
2008a Electronic document, http://www.city-data.com/city/El-Paso-Texas.html
2008b Electronic document, http://www.city-data.com/city/Lordsburg-New-Mexico.html
2008c Electronic document, http://www.city-data.com/city/Tubac-Arizona.html

City of Salinas Website
2008 Electronic document, http://www.ci.salinas.ca.us/ComPro.html

CNN
1998 Most of California's Prop. 187 Ruled Unconstitutional. March 19. Electronic document, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/03/19/prop.187/
2007 Lou Dobbs Tonight: Congress Responds to Rising Anger Over Dangerous Imports; Is Virtual Fence Virtual Flop?. Aired September 20. Electronic document, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0709/20/ldt.01.html

Cook-Lynn, Elizabeth
2004 The Lewis and Clark Story, the Captive Narrative, and the Pitfalls of Indian History. Wicazo Sa Review(Spring, 2004): American Indian Encounters with Lewis and Clark 19(1):21-33.

Confessore, Nicholas
2007 Some Support, but Still Furor Over New Plan for Licenses. New York Times, October 29.

Coutin, Susan Bibler
2003 Cultural Logics of Belonging and Movement: Transnationalism, Naturalization, and U.S. Immigration Politics. American Ethnologist 30(4): 508-526.

D'Amato, Paul
2006 The Meaning of Marxism: The Border Crossed Us. SocialistWorker.org, April 28. Electronic document, http://socialistworker.org/2006-1/586/586_13_Border.shtml.

De Genova, Nicholas P.
2002 Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life. Annual Review of Anthropology 31:419-447.

Dougherty, Jon E.
2004 Illegals: The Imminent Threat Posed by Our Unsecured US-Mexico Border. Nashville: WND Books.

ElAmin, Ahmed
2007 Del Monte Immigration Raid Highlights Problems. Food Production Daily. Electronic document, http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/news/ng.asp?id=77421-del-monte-immigration-labor

FactCheck.org
2006 RNC Ad Mischaracterizes Democratic Stance On Immigration. April 19. Electronic document, http://www.factcheck.org/rnc_ad_mischaracterizes_democratic_stance_on_immigration.html

Fetzer, Joel S.
2000 Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany. Cambridge University Press.

Fischer, Howard
2008 U.S. Challenge May Affect Employer-Sanctions Law: Enforcement Issues Persist for Private Business. Arizona Business Gazette, June 5. Electronic document, http://www.azcentral.com/business/abg/articles/2008/06/05/20080605abg-employment0605.html

Foucault, Michel
1979 Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Alan Sheridan, trans. New York: Vintage Books.

FoxNews.com
2004 Bush Immigration Reform Plan Draws Criticism. January 8. Electronic document, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,107707,00.html

Frosch, Dan
2007 Inmates Will Replace Migrants in Colorado Fields. New York Times, March 4. Electronic document, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04prisoners.html

Fussell, Elizabeth
2004 Sources of Mexico's Migration Stream: Rural, Urban, and Border Migrants to the United States. Social Forces 82(3):937-967.

G4S Wackenhut Website
2008a Homepage. Electronic document, http://www.g4s.com/usw.htm
2008b Transportation Services. Electronic document, http://www.g4s.com/usw/usw-services-transportation.htm

Galtung, Johan
1969 Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research 6(3):167-191.

Garvey, Stephen P.
1998 Freeing Prisoners' Labor. Stanford Law Review 50(2):339-398.

Gillison, Douglas
2005 Marines: Looking for a Few Good Aliens?: Recruiter on Trial for Selling ID's to Enlist Illegals. Village Voice, September 27.

Gledhill, John
1999 Official Masks and Shadow Powers: Towards an Anthropology of the Dark Side of the State. Urban Anthropology 28(3-4):200-251.
2002 The powers behind the masks Mexico's political class and social elites at the end of the millennium *In* Elite Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives. Shore, Cris and Stephen L. Nugent. Routledge.

Global Security.org
2008 Electronic document, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/fort-bliss.htm

Groban, Jr., Robert S.
2008 Best Compliance Practices and Immigration: Boost in Enforcement Puts Pressure on Employers to Remain Extra Vigilant. New York Law Journal, May 27. Electronic document, http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202421667868

Hafner, Katie and Daniel Preysman
2003 TECHNOLOGY; Special Visa's Use for Tech Workers Is Challenged. New York Times, May 30. Electronic Document, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EFDA1630F933A05756C0A9659C8B63

Hanson, Gordon H. and Antonio Spilimbergo
1999 Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border. The American Economic Review 89(5):1337-1357.

Heyman, Josiah McC.
1995 Putting Power in the Anthropology of Bureaucracy: The Immigration and Naturalization Service at the Mexico-United States Border. Current Anthropology 36(2):261-287.
2000 Respect for Outsiders? Respect for the Law? The Moral Evaluation of High-Scale Issues by US Immigration Officers. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 6(4):635-652.

Høivik, Tord
1977 The Demography of Structural Violence. Journal of Peace Research 14(1):59-73.

Holstege, Sean
2007 Mexican Trucks Poised to Ride into U.S. Arizona Republic, September 4. Electronic document, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-04-mexican-trucks_N.htm

Hsu, Spencer S.
2008 'Virtual Fence' Along Border To Be Delayed: U.S. Retooling High-Tech Barrier After 28-Mile Pilot Project Fails. Washington Post, February 28: Page A01. Electronic document, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/27/AR2008022703747.html?hpid=topnews&sub=new

Hunt, Katherine
2006 KBR Awarded Homeland Security Contract Worth up to $385M. Market Watch, January 24. Electronic document, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B62C8724D-AE8A-4B5C-94C7-70171315C0A0%7D&dateid=38741.5136277662-858254656

Huntoon, Laura
1998 Immigration to Spain: Implications for a Unified European Union Immigration Policy. International Migration Review 32(2):423-450.

Irvine, Stephanie
2002 Moroccan Disbelief at Island Drama. BBC News, July 18. Electronic document, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2135803.stm

International Monetary Fund
2006 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Database. April 2006. Electronic document, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/data/

Jackson, Jennifer V. and Mary E. Cothran
2003 Black versus Black: The Relationships among African, African American, and African Caribbean Persons. Journal of Black Studies 33(5):576-604.

Jordan, A. Grant
1981 Iron Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process. Journal of Public Policy 1(1):95-123.

Kaplan, Martha
1995 Panopticon in Poona: An Essay on Foucault and Colonialism. Cultural Anthropology 10(1):85-98.

Kearney, Michael
1991 Transnationalism in California and Mexico at the End of Empire. [Revised version of "Borders and Boundaries of the State and Self at the End of Empire"1991. In Border Cultures, Hasting Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, eds. London: Cambridge University Press.]
1995 The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism. Annual Review of Anthropology 24:547-565.

Lagerquist, Peter
2004 Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel's "Separation Wall" Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel's "Separation Wall". Journal of Palestine Studies 33(2): 5-35

Marx, Karl
2004 Thesis on Feuerbach: Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook In Anthropological Theory: An Introductory History 3rd edition. R. Jon McGee and Richard L. Warms, eds. Pp., 67-81. Boston: McGraw Hill.

McCombs, Brady
2007 Intent on Opening Permanent Station, Border Patrol Tries to Ease Concerns. Arizona Star, April 4.

McMurray, David A.
2001 In and Out of Morocco. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Michaels, Dave
2008 Administration Increases Penalties for Knowingly Hiring Illegal Immigrants: Employers Blast Latest Crackdown on Undocumented Workers. Dallas Morning News. February 22. Electronic document, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/022308dnbusemployerfines.3792180.html

Morales, Isidro
1999 NAFTA: The Institutionalisation of Economic Openness and the Configuration of Mexican Geo-Economic Spaces. Third World Quarterly, New Regionalisms in the New Millenium 20(5): 971-993

Moreno, Sylvia
2006 Along Part of the Border, A Zero-Tolerance Zone. Washington Post, June 17. Electronic document, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700455.html

Morlock, Blake
2007 Permanent Checkpoint Angers S. AZ Residents: Border Patrol Tries to Keep Immigrants Off I-19. Tucson Citizen. February 13.

Myerly, Scott Hughes
1992 "The Eye Must Entrap the Mind": Army Spectacle and Paradigm in Nineteenth-Century Britain. Journal of Social History 26(1):105-131.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
2008 Summary Table of State Speed Laws. Electronic Document, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/enforce/speedlaws501/summary_table.htm, accessed July 8, 2008.

Ong, Aihwa
2006 Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham: Duke University Press.

Oregonian, The
2007 Immigration Raid Pushes Oregon into Thick of Fight. Breaking News, June 13. Electronic document, http://blog.oregonlive.com/breakingnews/2007/06/feds_indict_three_in_immigrati.html

PBS.org
2007 President Bush Renews Push for Immigration Reform: Online NewsHour Transcript. Aired April 9. Electronic document, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-june07/immigration_04-09.html

Popkin, Samuel
1980 The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Peasant Society. Theory and Society 9(3):411-471.

Porteus, Liza
2007 2 Border Patrol Agents Turn Themselves in for Shooting Mexican Drug Runner. FoxNews.com, January 18. Electronic document, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,244193,00.html

Preston, Julia
2008 Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration. The New York Times. July 6.

Rather, Dan
2003 Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage: Plan Calls For Firing Up To 800 Cruise Missiles In First 2 Days Of War. CBS News, January 24. Electronic document, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml

Richey, Joseph
2006 Hotel U.S.A. AlterNet, March 14. Electronic document, http://www.alternet.org/story/33295/

Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L.
1986 Can Border Industries Be a Substitute for Immigration?. The American Economic Review 76(2):263-268.

Roberts, John W.
2008 Work, Education, and Public Safety: A Brief History of Federal Prison Industries. Electronic document, http://www.unicor.gov/about/organization/history/overview_of_fpi.cfm

Rosenblum, Marc R.
2004 Moving Beyond the Policy of No Policy: Emigration from Mexico and Central America. Latin American Politics and Society 46(4):91-125.

Sahr, Robert
2008 Inflation Conversion Factors for Dollars 1774 to Estimated 2018. Electronic document, http://oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/faculty-research/sahr/cv2008.pdf

Santiago, Levy
1991 Poverty alleviation in Mexico. World Bank Policy Research Paper. Electronic document, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000009265_3961001101728&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679

Schaeffer, Robert K.
2003 Understanding Globalization: The Social Consequences of Political, Economic, and Environmental Change, Second Edition. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Soden, Dennis L., David A. Schauer, Brent McCune, David Coronado and Janet S. Conary
2004 Research in Review: Regional Economic Impacts of Military Installations in the Paso del Norte Region. University of Texas at El Paso: Institute for Policy and Economic Development IPED Technical Reports.

Stephen, Lynn
2007 Transborder Lives: Indigenous Oaxacans in Mexico, California, and Oregon. Duke University Press.

Stoddard, Ellwyn R.
1976a A Conceptual Analysis of The "Alien Invasion": Institutionalized Support of Illegal Mexican Aliens in the U.S.. International Migration Review 10(2):157-189.
1976b Illegal Mexican Labor in the Borderlands: Institutionalized Support of an Unlawful Practice. The Pacific Sociological Review 19(2):175-210.

Straussfogel, Debra
1997 World-Systems Theory: Toward a Heuristic and Pedagogic Conceptual Tool. Economic Geography 73(1):118-130.

US Census Bureau
2000 Census 2000: Table FBP-1. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000; Population Universe: People Born in Mexico; Geographic Area: UNITED STATES. Electronic document, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/datatbls.html

US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
2008a Electronic document, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=480ccac09aa5d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=db029c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD, accessed February 10, 2008.
2008b Adjustment of the Immigration and Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition Fee Schedule [72 FR 29851] [FR 27-07]. Electronic document, http://www.uscis.gov/propub/ProPubVAP.jsp?dockey=c9aecd408423b3f800b01aa0c83dba52, accessed March 24, 2008.
2008c Immigration & Nationality Act. Electronic Document, http://www.uscis.gov/propub/DocView/slbid/1/2, accessed July 8, 2008.

2008d This is USCIS. Electronic Document, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=1dd5d0676988d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=a8d1c9ee2f82b010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD, accessed June 23, 2008.

2008e USCIS History. Electronic Document, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=f9239c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=f9239c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD, accessed June 23, 2008.

US Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

2003 Border Patrol History. Electronic document, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/history.xml

2007a Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2007. Electronic document, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/publications/admin/fiscal_2007_pub.ctt/fiscal_2007.pdf

2007b Giddens Tours AZ Wackenhut Facility. Secure Border Initiative Monthly. Volume 1 Edition 3. January 2008. Electronic document, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/sbi/sbi_monthly_newsletter/sbi_jan_08.ctt/sbi_jan_08.pdf

2008a U.S. Border Patrol - Protecting Our Sovereign Borders. Electronic Document, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history/bp_historcut.xml

2008b U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service - Populating a Nation: A History of Immigration and Naturalization. Electronic Document, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history/ins_history.xml

US Department of Agriculture

2008 Foreign Agricultural Service: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Electronic document, http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/Policy/nafta/nafta.asp

US Department of Commerce – Bureau of Economic Analysis

2006 News Release: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State, 2005. Electronic document, http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrel/gspnewsrelease.htm

US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

2008 Department Subcomponents and Agencies. Electronic Document, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/index.shtm

US Department of Transportation – Bureau of Transportation Statistics
2008 Query Detailed Statistics: New Data Starting 2007: Commodity by Port at Country Level. Electronic document, http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_QA.html

US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
2005 Fact Sheet: History of the ICE Investigation into Columbia's Cali Drug Cartel and the Rodriguez-Orejuela Brothers. Electronic Document, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/califs031105.htm

Vijayan, Sunita
2007 Locals Brace for Crackdown on Hiring Undocumented Immigrants. Salinas Californian. August 14.

Villegas, Daniel Cosío, and Ignacio Bernal, Alejandra Moreno Toscano, Luis González, Eduardo Blanquel and Lorenzo Meyer
1995 A Compact History of Mexico. México, D.F.: El Colegio de México.

Vitello, Paul
2006 Path to Deportation Can Start With a Traffic Stop. New York Times, April 14.

Vlahos, Kelley Beaucar
2006 Critics Fear Emergency Centers Could Be Used for Immigration Round-Ups. Fox News, June 7. Electronic document, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,198456,00.html

Wackenhut Services, Inc. Website
2008 WSI Corporate Overview. Electronic document, http://www.wsihq.com/WSI_Corporate_Overview.pdf

Weiss, Meira
2001 The Body of the Nation: Terrorism and the Embodiment of Nationalism in Contemporary Israel. Anthropological Quarterly 75(1): 37-62

Wilson, Samuel M. and Leighton C. Peterson
2002 The Anthropology of Online Communities. Annual Review of Anthropology 31: 449-467.

Wood, Daniel B.
2005 A Drought of Farm Labor. Christian Science Monitor, December 2. Electronic document, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1202/p01s03-usec.html